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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Attorneys-Disbarment by Trial Court on Own Motion.
D attorney was convicted in a North Carolina superior court of an
attempt to commit the crime against nature and sentenced to prison.
At the same time the judge entered an order striking his name from the
rolls of attorneys practicing in North Carolina. Upon appeal the conviction and disbarment were affirmed.' The supreme court recognized
that the State Bar Act of 19332 provides one procedure for disbarment
State v. Spivey, 213 N. C. 45, 195 S. E. 1 (1938).
2
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§215(1)-(18).
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but held that this is not exclusive and does not infringe upon the inherent power of the courts to disbar for cause. This had been explicitly
8
set forth in a 1937 amendment to the State Bar Act.
A power on the part of the courts to disbar attorneys has existed
since earliest times, 4 independently of statute, as an essential attribute
of the courts' control over their own officers. 5 Thus, the North Carolina Court, in cases arising before the State Bar Act, intimated that the
statutes declaring grounds for disbarment at that time did not limit its
common-law power to disbar for professional misconduct or for other
reasons deemed proper by the court, though not covered by the statute.0
In two cases subsequent to the enactment of the State Bar Act, the
North Carolina Supreme Court exercised its innate disbarring power
upon petition by the attorney general. 7 A state supreme court's power
to disbar, even though the integrated bar has the power also, is affirmed
by a recent case s in Nevada, a state which has practically the same state
bar machinery as North Carolina, including a provision similar to the
1937 amendment. The highest courts in cases from other states now
having integrated bars bolster the above decisions by holding that their
co-operation with their respective bar set-ups does not mean that their
natural power to disbar is abolished. 9 In a large number of decisions the
rule has been firmly established that where there is no integrated bar
having power to disbar a state supreme court has the inherent power to
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §215 (19).
'2 THORNToN, ATToRNEYs AT LAw (1914) 1167.
'Ex parte Brounsall, 2 Cow. Rep. 829 (K. B. 1778) (where court of King's

Bench struck name of attorney, convicted of a felony, off the roll, saying it was

within the court's discretion to do so when practitioner became unfit) ; see Ex Parte

Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 378, 18 L. ed. 366, 370 (U. S. 1866) ; State v. Kirke, 12
Fla. 278, 286 (1869); State v. Mosher, 128 Iowa 82, 87, 103 N. W. 105, 107
(1905); State v. Flynn, 160 La. 483, 486, 107 So. 314, 315 (1926); Danforth v.
Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021, 1023 (1909); 4 L. T. 102 (Eng. 1844) (to

effect that courts disciplined practitioners without aid of statute).
' See Ex Parte David Schenck, 65 N. C. 353, 368 (1871); In re Ebbs, 150

N. C. 44, 54, 63 S. E. 190, 195 (1908) ; State ex rel. Solicitor v. Johnson, 171 N. C.
799, 802, 88 S. E. 437, 438 (1916) ; State ex rel. Solicitor v. Johnson, 174 N. C.
345, 348, 93 S. E. 847, 849 (1917).
7State e
rel. Brummit, Attorney-General, v. Winburn, 206 N. C. 923. 175 S.
E. 498 (1934); State ex reL Attorney-General v. Gorson, 209 N. C. 320, 183

S. E.
392 (1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 662 (1936).
8
Dignan v. State Bar of Nevada, 70 P. (2d) 774, 776 (Nev. 1937).

'In re Shattuck, 208 Cal. 6, 279 Pac. 998 (1929) 1(a disciplinary order by the

Board of Governors of the State Bar was treated by the supreme court as merely
recommendatory) ; In re Sparks, 267 Ky. 93, 101 S. W. (2d) 194 (1936) (in
setting up the Board of Bar Comm'rs in deference to the Bar Act, the court of

appeals was 'but exerting its inherent power); Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Yonts,
270 Ky. 503, 109 S. W. (2d) 1186 (1937); In re Mundy, 182 La. 148, 161 So.

184 (1935)

(State Bar Act did not interfere with supreme court's original

jurisdiction in disbarment proceedings); State v. Greathouse, 55 Nev. 409, 36 P.
(2d) 357 (1934) (Board of Governors of Bar suspended D and such action was
construed to be recommendatory to supreme court which had the final authority) ;
In re Royal, 34 N. M. 554, 286 Pac. 156 (1930) semble; In re Shoemake, 168
Okla. 77, 31 P. (2d) 928 (1934); In re Barclay, 82 Utah 288, 24 P. (2d) 302
(1933) semble.
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discipline attorneys by suspension or disbarment, independently of statutes;1O that it exists as a corollary of the power to admit attorneys to
12
practice when the latter right is given by statute;"' and that statutes
or constitutions' s giving them power to disbar are only declaratory of a
right already existing. It is recognized that the legislature may legislate to aid in the exercise of such power by the court but may not frustrate or abolish it.1 4 In England and Canada, however, the exclusive
power of final disbarment of barristers has for many generations been
exercised by the Inns of Court' 5 and the Law Society,16 respectively,
with but a limited judicial review permitted as to the reasonableness of
the proceeding.
Granting that state supreme courts may disbar on their own initiative, the query now becomes whether the power may be extended to an
inferior court of general jurisdiction.17 The disbarment of an attorney by
"In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 Pac. 29 (1926) ; In re Spriggs, 36 Ariz. 262,
284 Pac. 521 (1930) ; People v. Harris, 273 Ill. 413, 112 N. E. 978 (1916) ; In re
Information to Discipline Certain Attorneys for Sanitary District of Chicago,
351 Ill. 206, 184 N. E. 332 (1932) ; In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W. (2d)
672 (1933) ; In re Pate, 107 S. W. (2d) 157 (Mo. 1937) ; State v. Crocker, 132
Neb. 214, 271 N. W. 444 (1937); State Bar Comm. v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745,
131 Pac. 703 (1912); State v. Ledbetter, 127 Okla. 85, 260 Pac. 454 (1927) (both
inherent and statutory power) ; In re Egan, 22 S.D. 355, 117 N. W. 874 (1908) ;
In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 Pac. 217 (1913); In re Burton, 67 Utah 118,
246 Pac. 188 (1926) (both inherent and statutory power); In re Bruen, 102
Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 1152 (1918); see In re Gorsuch, 113 Kan. 380, 214 Pac.
794, 796 (1923).
"In re De Caro, 220 Iowa 176, 262 N. W. 132 (1935) ; Commonwealth ex rel
Ward v. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41, 98 S.W. (2d) 53 (1936); State Bar Comm.
v. Sullivan, 35 Okla. 745, 131 Pac. 703 (1912); In re Brown, 64 S. D. 87,
264 N. W. 521 (1936) ; In re Haddad, 106 Vt. 322, 173 Atl. 103 (1934) ; In re
Robinson, 48 Wash. 153, 92 Pac. 929 (1907); see Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall.
335, 354, 20 L. ed. 646, 651 (U. S. 1871) (power of removal from the bar is
possessed by all courts that have power to admit attorneys to practice); Ex
parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 512, 22 L. ed. 205, 208 (U. S. 1873) ; In re Westcott, 66 Conn. 585, 587, 34 Atl. 505 (1895); State v. Harber, 129 Mo. 271, 31
S. W. 889, 892 (1895).
"State v. Mosher, 128 Iowa 82, 103 N. W. 105 (1905); In re Sparks, 267
Ky. 93, 101 S. W. (2d) 194 (1936) ; State v. Harber, 129 Mo. 271, 31 S. W.
889 (1895) ; Ill re Simpson, 9 N. D. 379, 83 N. W. 541 (1900).
"State v. Flynn, 160 La. 483, 107 So. 314 (1926).
"In re Bailey, 30 Ariz. 407, 248 Pac. 29 (1926); In re Myrland, 45 Ariz.
484, 45 P. (2d) 953 (1935); Brydonjack v. State Bar of Calif., 208 Cal. 439,
281 Pac. 1018 (1929) ; In re Richards, 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W. (2d) 672 (1933) ;
In re Shoemake, 168 Okla. 77, 31 P. (2d) 928 (1934); In re Bruen, 102 Wash.
472, 172 Pac. 1152 (1918); State v. Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N. W. 441
(1932) sentble.

1 DnILoN,

THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE OF ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1894)
OF ENGLAND (1908) §608 (decisions of Inns of Court
subject to review by the Lord Chancellor and the judges of the High Court of
Justice, sitting as a domestic tribunal).
"Rv. STAT. ONT. (1914) c. 157, §§45-46; 2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

90; 2 HALSBURY, LAwS

(1914) 1182.

27Inferior courts of limited jurisdiction are not vested with power to disbar:
Baird v. Justice's Court of Riverside, 11 Cal. App. 439, 105 Pac. 259 (1909)
(Justice's court may not remove or suspend); Mattler v. Schaffner et n.., 53
Ind. 245 (1876)

(inferior court of criminal jurisdiction unable to disbar) ; State
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a trial court upon its own initiative marks a new step in the discipline
of attorneys in this state. However, in a recent Massachusetts case an
attorney, guilty of larceny, was disbarred by a trial court upon its own
motion from all courts of the state. This was upheld by the state
supreme court independently of a statute which gave the trial court
power to disbar.' 8 Earlier Massachusetts cases relied upon by the court
were to the same effect. 19 In several other instances inferior courts
have been held to be vested with power to disbar from all courts independently of and nothwithstanding statutes. A superior court, having
knowledge of an attorney's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, was held authorized to suspend from all courts of the state until
final disbarment proceedings. 20 In another instance, where an attorney
had been convicted of receiving stolen goods, a county court of common
pleas was held inherently empowered to disbar.2 ' A county circuit
court was allowed to disbar without statutory authority where an
22
attorney was guilty of an attempt to stifle evidence relating to a crime.
Likewise another circuit court was held empowered to disbar from all
courts of the commonwealth where an attorney made false representations to a minor in proceedings to appoint a guardian. 23 An intermediate
appellate court has been held to have power to disbar in an original
proceeding before it.24 Some decisions are to the effect that any court
of record possesses the power to suspend attorneys from practicing
before it, but that a statute is necessary to make such disbarment effec-

tive in all courts of the state.25 The power of expelling from the one
court alone has been exercised by county courts, 20 federal district
courts, 27 a state district court,25 and a state circuit court. 20 In one
v. Laughlin, 73 Mo. 443 (1881) (St. Louis Criminal Court could not disbar);
State ex re. Storts v. Peabody, 63 Mo. App. 378 (1895) (City of St. Louis could
not authorize police justices to disbar or suspend from appearing before them) ;
Bloomingdale v. 'Hudson, 147 Misc. 759, 264 N. Y. Supp. 639 (Sup. Ct. 1933)
(Municipal
court could not discipline attorneys for misconduct).
'2 In re Stern, 12 N. E. (2d) 100 (Mass. 1937).
"See Randall, Petitioner for certiorari,93 Mass.. 472 (1865); Bar Ass'n of
City of Boston v. Casey, 211 Mass. 187, 192, 97 N. E. 751, 754 (1912); In re
Carver, 224 Mass. 169 112 N. E. 877, 879 (1916) ; In re Ulmer, 268 Mass. 373,
397, 167 N. E. 749, 755 (1929) ; In re Opinion of the Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 610,
180 N. E. 725, 727, 81 A. L. R. 1064 (1932) ; In re Mayberry, 3 N. E. (2d) 248,
250 (Mass. 1936).
1 De Krasner v. Boykin, 54 Ga. App. 29, 186 S.E. 701 (1936).
"In re Wolfe's Disbarment, 288 Pa. St. 331, 135 AtI. 732 (1927).
'In re Shepard, 109 Mich. 631, 67 N. W. 971 (1896).
'Lenihan v. Commonwealth, 165 Ky. 93, 176 S.W. 948 (1915.).
"In re Sparrow, 338 Mo. 203, 90 S.W. (2d) 401 (1935). Contra: In re
Meck, 51 Ohio App. 237, 200 N. E. 478 (1935).
'Legal Club of Lynchburg v. Light, 137 Va. 249, 119 S.E. 55 (1923) ; State
v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 250, 10 S.E. 407 (1889).
' State v. Kirke, 12 Fla. 278 (1869).
' Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505, 22 L. ed. 205 (ILS. 1873); Barnes v.
Lyons, 187 Fed. 881 (C. C. A. 9th, 1911) ; Hertz v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 52
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state the superior court is given original power by statute to disbar from
all courts ;50 in others the superior and supreme court are given concurrent jurisdiction. 1
Thus, the principal case is supported by authority. In cases where
the attorney is clearly shown to be an unworthy practitioner, there
should be no objection to the extension of judicial disbarment to an
inferior court which has peculiar knowledge of the situation and may
preserve the dignity of all the courts by immediate action. The rights
of the attorney are protected by an appeal to the state appellate court.
WILLIS C. SMITHa.
Bankruptcy-Lien of Trustee Under Section 47a (2).
A recent case in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decided for
the first time the rights of a trustee in bankruptcy to North Carolina
real property "not within the custody of the bankruptcy court." The
bankrupt, thirteen years prior to the bankruptcy, had conveyed the
property for valuable consideration to defendant's predecessor in title,
who had entered into possession, paid taxes, and made improvements.
The conveyance was not properly recorded as to the bankrupt until
after. the certificate of adjudication of bankruptcy had been filed in the
county where the land is located. The trustee sought to enforce a lien
which he claimed was given him under the Bankruptcy Act. The circuit court of appeals, reversing the district court, held that the trustee,
having the rights of "a judgment creditor with execution duly returned
unsatisfied," has no lien in North Carolina.'
Prior to the 1910 amendment to section 47a (2) of the Bankruptcy
3
Act,2 the trustee "stood in the shoes of the bankrupt." Since in most
jurisdictions, as in North Carolina, an unrecorded conveyance is good as
(C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Conley v. United States, 59 F. (2d) 929 (C. C. A. 8th,
1932).
2'State v. Raynolds, 22 N. M. 1, 158 Pac. 413 (1916) (subject to supreme
court's completely disbarring).
" Clark v. Reardon, 104 S. W. (2d) 407 (Mo. 1937).
'CONN. GEN. STAr. (1930) §§5343-5346.
*'CAL.CODE Civ. PROC. (Deering, 1937) §287; MAss. ANN. LAws (1933)
c. 221, §40.
1
Southern Dairies v. Banks, 92 F. (2d) 282 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937), cert. denied,
58 Sup. Ct 368, 82 L. ed. 261 (U. S.1937).
... and such trustees, as to all property in the custody or coming into
the custody of the ,bankruptcy court, shall be deemed vested with all the rights,
remedies, and powers of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings thereon; and also, as to all property not in the custody of the bankruptcy
court, shall be deemed vested with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a ]udgment creditor holding an execution duly returned unsatisfied." 36 STAT. 840
(1910), 11 U. S. C. A. §75(a) (2) (1926), 3 F. C. A. tit. 11, §75(a) (2)

(1937).
3
York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S.344, 26 Sup. Ct. 481, 50 L. ed. 782
(1906).
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between the parties, 4 it was impossible for the trustee to attack successfully such conveyances 'of the bankrupt in the absence of bad faith.5
The amendment was passed to remedy this situation. Whatever rights
the trustee has superior to those of the bankrupt, then, are given by this
amendment.
It is now well established that as to property "in the custody of the
bankruptcy court" the lien given to the trustee by the amendment is
superior to secret or unrecorded liens or conveyances. 6 There have been
few cases, however, on the rights of a trustee as to property not in the
custody of the bankruptcy court. Indeed, few courts have had occasion
to recognize the distinction, or have bothered to do so.
Property is not "in the custody of the bankruptcy court" when it is
at the time the bankruptcy is begun "in the exclusive possession, . . .
under claim of right," of someone other than the bankrupt,7 or "not in
the possession of the bankrupt, trustee, or any officer of the court." s But
some courts have said that it may be in the "constructive possession" of
the court, "though in the actual possession of the bankrupt or a third
person under a merely colorable [claim of] right." Thus, where real
property had been in the possession of the vendee under a parol contract
of purchase for ten years prior to the bankruptcy, it was held "not in
the custody."' 0 The same result was reached where real property was
in the possession of the holder of an unrecorded deed as in the principal
case ;"1 where property of the bankrupt, held under an unrecorded lease
having the effect of a mortgage, was taken on execution by a third person before the bankruptcy ;12 where a bankrupt husband who had held
3
it in trust for his wife conveyed to her shortly before the bankruptcy.1
The same result apparently was reached in a more extreme case where
In re Cunningham, 64 F. (2d) 296 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933) ; Leggett v. Bullock,
44 N. C. 283 (1853) ; McBrayer v. Harrill, 152 N. C. 712, 68 S. E. 204 (1910) ;
see South Ga. Motor Co. v. Jackson, 184 N. C. 328, 331, 114 S. E. 478, 479

(1922).
'York Mfg. Co. v. Cassell, 201 U. S. 344, 26 Sup. Ct. 481, 50 L. ed. 782
(1906); Hewitt v. Berlin Machine Works, 194 U. S. 296, 24 Sup. Ct. 690,
48 L. ed. 986 (1904).
'Fairbanks v. Wills, 240 U. S. 642, 36 Sup. Ct. 466, 60 L. ed. 841 (1916);
Cooper Grocery Co. v. Park, 218 Fed. 42 (C. C. A. 5th, 1914); Potter Mfg.
Co. v. Arthur, 220 Fed. 843 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915); In re Duker Ave. Meat
Market, 2 F. (2d) 699 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924); Farmers' State Bank v. Benston,
29 F. (2d) 902 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Midwest Production Co. v. Doerner, 70
F. (2d) 194 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934). Contra: In re Gamble, 14 F. (2d) 847
(W. D. Pa. 1926) semble.
"In re Snelling, 202 Fed. 259, 261 (D. Mass. 1912).
'Lewin v. Telluride Iron Works, 272 Fed. 590, 594 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921).
'Vincent v. Tafeen, 40 F. (2d) 823, 824 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930).
"' Clark v. Snelling, 205 Fed. 240 (C. C. A. 1st, 1913).
"United States Plywood Co. v. Verrill, 131 Maine 469, 164 Atl. 200 (1933).
'Lewin v. Telluride Iron Works, 272 Fed. 590 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921).
"Conron v. Cauchois, 242 Fed. 909 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
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the title was in a third person, but the bankrupt himself was in posses14
sion under a contract to purchase,
As to property "not in the custody" the trustee is given by the statute
the rights of "a judgment creditor holding an execution duly returned
unsatisfied."' 5 The law of the state where the property is located determines the rights and powers of-a trustee who is so armed.16 Under
North Carolina law, a judgment creditor with execution returned unsatisfied has no lien unless the judgment is properly docketed in the
county where the land is located. 17 The clerks of the superior courts
are required by statute' s to enter all judgments on the docket before
execution, but if they neglect this duty there is no lienl'-though they
2
may become liable on their bonds. 20 In addition, the federal courts, '
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 22 and numerous inferior
county,23 recorder, 24 and justice of the peace2 5 courts in the state can
issue executions without any entry on the judgment docket of the county.
The trustee has no actual judgment which can be docketed to create
a lien in his favor; he has only the status of a judgment creditor. Furthermore, the requirement that a certificate of the adjudication be filed
in the county where the property is located 26 is generally held to be
directory only,27 and such filing is not essential to his lien-which he
takes, if he takes at all, as of the date the petition in bankruptcy was
'See Wilson v. Holub, 202 Iowa 549, 552, 210 N. W. 593, 594 (1926).
'See note 2, supra.
"Matter of Floyd-Scott Co., 224 Fed. 987 (D. Mass. 1915) ; 'Hoyt v. Gibell,
259 Fed. 186 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919); Lewin v. Telluride Iron Works, 272 Fed.
590 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921); Albert Pick & Co. v. Wilson, 19 F. (2d) 18 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1927); It re Bowling Constr. Corp., 19 F. (2d) 604 (D. Md. 1927);
see Potter M fg. Co. v. Arthur, 220 Fed. 843, 846 (C. C. A. 6th, 1915).
'Holman v. Miller, 103 N. C. 118, 9 S.E. 428 (1889); Young v. Connelly,
112 X. C. 646, 17 S.E. 424 (1892) ; Jones v. Currie, 190 N. C. 260, 129 S. E. 605
(1925) ; MCINToSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROcrURE (1929) §§664, 665.
IN. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §670.
Jones v. Currie, 190 N. C. 260, 129 S. E. 605 (1925) ; Bernhardt v. Brown,
122 N. C. 587, 29 S.E. 884 (1898); McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE

(1929)

§717.

"Holman v. Miller, 103 N. C. 118, 9 S. E. 429 (1889) ; Bernhardt v. Brown,
122 N. C. 587, 29 S.E. 884 (1898). McINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE

(1929) §665.

REV. STAT.

§916 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. §727 (1928), 8 F. C. A. tit 28,

§727 (1937); see Naumburg v. Hyatt, 24 Fed. 898, 902 (C. C. W. D. N. C.
1885).

2Johnson v. Richmond & D. Ry., 109 N. C. 505, 13 S. E. 881 (1891);
Midgett v. Vann, 158 N. C. 128, 73 S. E. 801 (1912); McINTosHf, NORTH CARO-

LINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929)

§25.
'. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §1608(dd).

91Id. §1598.
'Id. §1521; see Bailey v. Hester, 101 N. C. 538, 540, 8 S.E. 164, 165 (1888).
m32 STAT. 799 (1903), 11 U. S. C. A. §75(c) (1927), 3 F. C. A. tit. 11,
§75 (c) (1937).
IHull v. Burr, 61 Fla. 625, 55 So. 852 (1911); see Ward v. Hargett, 151
N. C. 365, 369, 66 S.E. 340, 342 (1909).
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filed. 23 A few decisions look in the opposite direction, holding that the
trustee may lose certain rights by failing to file this notice.2 9 The reason30
ing of these latter cases has the approval of some leading text writers,
but no cases have been found in which it was held that the trustee added
anything to his title by filing this certificate.
The courts, in previous decisions on the rights of trustees as to
property not in the custody of the court, have almost uniformly held, as
in the instant case, that the trustee had no lien since the mere obtaining
of a judgment and having execution returned unsatisfied does not give
one.31 In Lewin v. Telluride Ironi Works,32 a frequently cited decision,
a trustee was held to have no lien on real and personal property, not in
the custody of the bankruptcy court, superior to an unrecorded mortgage "in the absence of filing of docket entry with the clerk of the
county." To the same effect is United States Plywood Co. v. Verrill,
where the fact situation was very similar to the principal case. Of
course, it must be borne in mind that the recording laws of the states
where these cases arose differ in some respects from our own. In the
only North Carolina case which deals with the situation, the question
was not presented from this angle, and the decision, though consistent
34
with the result in this case, went on another point.
The framers of the amendment must have intended, by placing property in the custody of the court and property not in such custody in
different categories, to make some distinction between them. If they
intended to give the trustee a lien as to both, it was inconsistent expressly to give a lien in the first class of property and to fail to mention
it in the second; further, the distinction that they were at such pains to
make would be a useless one. Possibly the purpose of the second clause
of the amendment was, as a number of courts have said, to give the
trustee as to property "not in the custody," the status necessary to go
into equity to recover any equitable interest in the property which a
" Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268, 36
275 (1915); Fairbanks v. Wills, 240 U. S. 642, 36 Sup.
(1916); Martin v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 245 U. S.
62 L. ed. 441 (1918).
"Beach v. Faust, 2 Cal. (2d) 290, 40 P. (2d) 822
Wavra, 331 Ill. 508, 163 N. E. 340 (1928).
R S mINGToN, BANKRUPTCY

(3d ed. Supp. 1937) §1141.

Sup. Ct. 50, 60 L. ed.
Ct. 466, 60 L. ed. 814
513, 38 Sup. Ct. 176,
(1935); Vombrack v.

"In re Snelling, 202 Fed. 259 (D. Mass. 1912), aff'd, Clark v. Snelling, 205
Fed. 240 (C. C. A. 1st, 1913); Lewin v. Telluride Iron Works, 212 Fed. 590(C. C. A. 8th, 1921) ; Vincent v. Tafeen, 40 F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930);
United States Plywood Co. v. Verrill, 131 Maine 469, 164 Atl. 200 (1933).
Accord: Sparks v. Weatherly, 176 Ala. 324, 58 So. 280 (1912); Harper v.
Dothan Nat. Bank, 223 Ala. 26, 134 So. 623 (1931); Brooks v. American Lumber
Co., 162 Minn. 220, 202 N. W. 818 (1925). Cf. In re Sachs, 30 F. (2d) 510
(C. C. A. 4th, 1929).
212 Fed. 590 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921).
= 131 Maine 469, 164 Att 200 (1933).
Gosney v McCullers, 202 N. C. 326, 162 S. E. 746 (1932).
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creditor so armed could get.3 5 It has been held that the status of a
judgment creditor with execution returned unsatisfied gives the trustee
the right to get at surpluses of spendthrift trusts of the bankrupt "in
the same way and by the same processes as are available to a creditor
with unsatisfied execution." 86 A trustee with this status may maintain
an action of trespass on the case to recover damages caused by a conspiracy to transfer and conceal the property of the 'bankrupt.3 7 The
right of a trustee to attack the fraudulent foreclosure of a mortgage 8
is ascribed to the status given him by the amendment. Dicta in a number of other cases lend recognition to this interpretation of the purpose
of the act.89 This view also seems to have found support among some
leading text writers including Remington, 4 0 who aided in the drafting
of the amendment.
However, in a passage often quoted by the courts from the report
of the congressional committee which drew up the amendment, it was
said of this provision: "... [The amendment] will give to creditors all
the rights that creditors under the state law might have had had there
been no bankruptcy, and from which they are debarred by the bank4
ruptcy" 41 (italics ours). In North Carolina under Eaton v. Doub 2
any of the creditors could have reached this property by reducing his
claim to a judgment and levying on it. Of course, the result reached in
Eaton v. Doub, a strict insistence on record notice as opposed to actual
notice, seems rather harsh when it, as in the present case, disregards
strong equities existing in favor of the grantee of an unrecorded conveyance, who has paid full consideration. This is especially so when
the property has not been in the bankrupt's possession for years so that
no one should have been misled. But this decision has never been overruled, and the result of the principal case denies the creditors the right
to take advantage of it in cases of a bankruptcy. Under this decision,
Sattler v. Slonimsky, 199 Fed. 592 (E. D. Pa. 1912); In re Reynolds, 243
Fed. 268 (N. D. N. Y. 1917); Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Detroit Creamery,
265 Mich. 636, 251 N. W. 797 (1933) ; Forbes v. Snow, 239 Mass. 138, 131 N. E.
299 (1921) semble. Contrast Jenks v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 170 App.
Div. 830, 156 N. Y. Supp. 478 (1st Dep't 1915) (after 1910 Amendment) with
Butler v. Baudoine, 84 App. Div. 215, 82 N. Y. Supp. 773 (1st Dep't 1903) (before
1910 Amendment).
"In re Reynolds, 243 Fed. 268 (N. D. N. Y. 1917).
' Sattler v. Slonimsky, 199 Fed. 592 (E. D. Pa. 1912).
'Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Detroit Creamery, 265 Mich. 636, 251 N. W.
797 (1933).
' See Scoron v. Cauchois, 242 Fed. 909, 911 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917); Wilson

v. Holub, 202 Iowa 549, 552, 210 N. W. 593, 594 (1926); Jones v. Bank of
Excelsior, 201 Mo. App. 545, 548, 213 S. W. 892, 893 (1919).
0"The trustee may now institute suits to subject interests of the bankrupt in
equitable estates, where the return of execution unsatisfied is a prerequisite to
equity jurisdiction." REmiNGToN, BANKRUPTCY (4th ed. 1935) §1557.
"SN.
REP. No. 691, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910) 7; 4 REmixmoN, BANKRurrcy

(4th ed. 1935) 392.

. 190 N. C. 14, 128 S. E. 494 (1925).
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the Bankruptcy Act takes away from the creditors the right to protect
their claims by reducing them to judgment and does not give to the
trustee "all the rights that the creditors . .. might have had had there

lbeen no bankruptcy." At the same time, it opens the door to the possibility of fraud on the creditors by permitting grantees and mortgagees
to perfect their titles, after the petition in bankruptcy, by filing for registration unrecorded conveyances of property not in the custody of the
court.
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Our conclusion must be, however, that the principal case is well
supported by the authority of the previous decisions in the field. If
congress intended that the trustee should get more than a mere "right
to go into equity" relative to this class of property, the decisions construing the provision have defeated that intention, and further legislation will be necessary to make it effective.
JAmEs B. CRAIGHILL.
Bills and Notes-Checks--Acceptance by Retention
of Check by Drawee.
Defendant drawee bank held for three days after presentment for
payment a check drawn on it, then returned the item to the cashing bank
unpaid because the drawer's signature was discovered to be a forgery.
In an action by the holder, an accommodation indorser who had repaid
the amount of the check to the cashing bank after its return, it was
as acceptor under Section
held1 that the drawee bank was not bound
2
137 of The Negotiable Instruments Law.
In the absence of a statute to the contrary it is an acknowledged principle of commercial law that the mere retention of a bill of exchange or
a check for even an unreasonable time or a mere failure to return after
a demand to do so, unaccompanied by circumstances from which an
acceptance may be implied, is not sufficient to render the drawee liable
as acceptor of the instrument.3 The English law to like effect is well
settled.4 There are cases, however, in which a drawee, who has refused

to surrender to the rightful owner a bill or a check after a request for
'*This type of fraud would be quite possible in North Carolina where the creditors, in extending credit to the bankrupt, have relied on the record, which shows
the title apparently in him.
v. The Peoples Bank, 212 N. C. 707, 194 S. E. 464 (1938).
'Seymour
2
N. C. CoDE ANx. (Michie 1935) §3119, "Where a drawee to whom a bill
is delivered for acceptance destroys the same or refuses within twenty-four hours
after such delivery, or within such other time as the holder may allow, to return
the bill accepted or nonaccepted to the holder, he will be deemed to have accepted
the same".
' Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver v. Boettcher, 5 Colo. 185 (1879) ; Overman v.
Hoboken City Bank, 31 N. J. Law 563 (1864).
'Jeune v. Ward, 2 Stark. 326, 1 B. & Aid. 653 (Eng. 1818).
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its return, has been held liable in damages to the latter to the extent
of the actual value of the instrument for the conversion thereof.5
At an early date before the enactment into law in that state of The
Negotiable Instruments Law it was provided in New York by statute8
that a drawee, to whom a bill was delivered for acceptance, should be
deemed to have accepted the same upon refusal to return it accepted or
nonaccepted within twenty-four hours. Acceptance thereunder was
held, however, to be predicated upon the tortious act of the drawee in
holding the bill after a demand had been made for its return.7 A
similar judicial construction was given like acts in other jurisdictions. 8
This New York statute was incorporated bodily into The Negotiable
Instruments Law as Section 137. 9 As would be expected, early decisions
construing this section accorded with constructions of the parent statute,
mere failure to return the bill, in the absence of a demand, being held
not to constitute acceptance.10 Many courts, moreover, have refused
to extend the section to checks presented for payment on the ground
that there is no presentment for acceptance within its meaning i
2
first adjudged
The case of Wisner v. First Nat. Bank of Gallitzin=
3
that by Section 137 nonreturn of a check' within twenty-four hours of
its presentment for payment, even in the absence of any additional
demand by the holder for its return, constitutes acceptance by the
drawee. The court reasoned that presentment itself is a demand for
acceptance or return and a failure to comply with this demand constitutes acceptance under the statute without more. This decision has
found a large following' 4 and represents the present overwhelming
'Louisville & N. R. R. v. Citizens & Peoples Nat. Bank, 74 Fla. 385, 77 So.
104 (1917); Burstein v. People's Trust Co., 13 App. Div. 165, 127 N. Y. Supp.
1092 (2d Dep't 1911); Knoxville Water Co. v. East Tenn. Nat. Bank, 123

Tenn. 364, 131 S. W. 447 (1910).
,1
N. Y. STATS. (1869) 722.
T
v. Moulton, 11 Hun. 268 (N. Y. 1877), aff'd 79 N. Y. 627 (1880).
Matteson
8
St. Louis & S. W. R. R. v. James, 78 Ark. 490, 95 S. W. 804 (1906) ; Lockhart v. Moss, 53 Mo. App. 633 (1893); Dickinson v. Marsh, 57 Mo. App. 566
(1894).
9
An early criticism of this section appeared in Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1900) 14 HARv. L. Rxv. 241, 245, "A refusal to accept is an acceptance! Such a perversion of language would be strange enough anywhere, but in a
framed code is well-nigh inexplicable".
deliberately
0
Westberg v. Chicago Lumber Co., 117 Wis. 589, 94 N. W. 572 (1903).

'First Nat. Bank of Omaha v. Whitmore, 177 Fed. 397 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910);

Kentucky Title Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Dunavan, 205 Ky. 801, 266 S. W.

667
(1924); First Nat. Bank of Goree v. Talley, 115 Tex. 591, 285 S. W. 612
(1926).
( 220 Pa. 21, 68 At. 955 (1908).

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAWS §185, "A check is a bill of exchange drawn
on a bank payable on demand. Except as herein otherwise provided, the provisions of this act applicable to a bill of exchange payable on demand apply to a
check."
2'First Nat. Bank of Winnfield v. Citizens' Bank of Campti, 163 La. 919, 113
So. 147 (1927); Miller v. Farmers' State Bank of Arco, 165 Minn. 339, 206
N. W. 930 (1925); Clarke v. Nat. Bank of Mont., 78 Mont. 48, 252 Pac. 373
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weight of authority. 15 It has been urged that in the interest of uniformity this construction of the statute be generally adopted. 16 A
strong expression of approval by the North Carolina court17 of the
holding in the Wisner case leads to the conclusion that it will follow
the majority rule in the case of retention beyond the twenty-four hour
period after presentment for payment of a check on which the drawer's
signature is genuine.
In the principal case the court, tacitly assuming the majority rule
above set forth to be the law,18 concluded that Section 137 has no
application to a check on which the drawer's signature has been forged,
since "a forged paper is neither a bill nor a check". 19 This holding
overlooks the fact that the right which the plaintiff seeks to enforce has
accrued to him, not through the drawer's forged signature, but, rather,
by virtue of the drawee's statutory acceptance by its conduct in retaining the instrument more than twenty-four hours after delivery to it.
Though admittedly rights do not arise through a counterfeit signature,
unless there be circumstances justifying the preclusion of the defense
of forgery, there are instances in which rights do accrue upon and
incident to a commercial paper on which there is a forgery. For instance, the transferor of a negotiable note must answer to his trans(1926) ; State Bank v. Weiss, 46 Misc. 93, 91 N. Y. Supp. 276 (Sup. Ct. 1904) ;
Clark v. Northern Pac. Ry., 55 N. D. 454, 214 N. W. 33 (1927); American
Nat. Bank of Ardmore v. Nat. Bank of Claremore, 119 Okla. 149, 249 Pac.
424 (1926); Mt. Vernon Bank v. Canby State Bank, 129 Ore. 36, 276 Pac.
262 (1929).
(In each of" these cases, as in Wisner v. Bank, 220 Pa. 21, 68
AMt. 955 (1908), cited, supra note 12, the drawer's signature was genuine.)
BRANNxAw, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW (5th ed. 1932) 1005; 2 DANIEL,
NEGOTIiALE INsTR u MxTs (7th ed. 1933) 622.
1 BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 15, at 1006.
' Standard Trust Co. v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 166 N. C. 112, 120, 81 S. E.
1074, 1077 (1914). In this case it was held to be error for the trial court to fail
to leave to the jury the question of the liability of the drawee bank to which a
check was sent for collection for failure to use due diligence in collection. The
Negotiable Instruments Law was not applied.
'Further evidence that the North Carolina court is committed to the doctrine
of acceptance by retention appears in Dawson v. Nat. Bank of Greenville, 196
N. C. 134, 144 S. E. 833 (1928), subsequent appeal 197 N. C. 499, 150 S. E.
38 (1929), in which the drawee bank, having paid the check to a party not entitled, was held to have accepted the instrument and was required to answer to
the rightful owner for its face amount. The Negotiable Instruments Law was not
cited. In a note to this case, (1928) 7 N. C. L. REV. 191, it 'was contended that the
drawee should have been charged, not with acceptance, but with conversion of the
check, in which event recovery would have been limited to its actual value.
ITo reach thii conclusion the court applied NmOTABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
§23, N. C. CODE AN. (Michie 1935) §3003, "Where a signature is forged or
made without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, it
is wholly inoperative, and no right to retain the instrument or to give a discharge therefor or to enforce payment thereof against any party thereto can be
acquired through or under such signature, unless the party against whom it is
sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up such forgery or want
of authority."
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feree when it develops that the maker's signature is false ;20 the indorser of a check on which the name of a prior indorser has been
forged, warrants his title and that the instrument is genuine and,
therefore, becomes bound to all parties subsequent to him ;21 a drawee
becomes bound in favor of an innocent holder by his written acceptance
of a forged bill ;22 and a drawee may not recover money paid to an innocent holder upon a forged bill.2 3 there is no statutory distinction, and
there appears to be no valid reason for a judicial differentiation, between an instrument which may be the subject of acceptance in writing
or by payment and that which may be accepted by retention.
If Section 137 is to be extended to checks presented for payment it
is felt that it should be held, contrary to the instant case, that it is
equally applicable to a check on 4which, unknown to the holder, the
2
drawer's signature is a forgery.
JuLIANr C. FRANKLIN.
Contempt of Court, Civil and Criminal-Review
of Contempt Orders in the Federal Courts.
Adjudged in contempt by a federal district court for violating a
temporary injunction in a patent infringement suit, the defendant was
fined $125 as punishment for disrespect to the court and $1,044 as
reimbursement to plaintiff for his expenses in the contempt proceedings. In considering its jurisdiction to hear the defendant's appeal, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the contempt order
would have been interlocutory and not appealable had it been purely
remedial or compensatory but decided that, inasmuch as the fine was
punitive to the extent of $125, the character of the order for purposes
of review was fixed as a punishment for criminal contempt, final and
subject to appeal. Nevertheless, the court held that Rule 3 of the
new rules promulgated by the Supreme Court for appeals in criminal
cases' is applicable to appeals from criminal contempt judgments and,
since the defendant failed to file his appeal within five days from the
"Cluseau

v. Wagner, 126 La. 375, 52 So. 547 (1910); Hunt v. Sanders, 228

Mo. 337, 232 S. W. 456 (1921).
" Main Street Bank v. Planters' Nat. Bank of Richmond, 116 Va. 137, 81
S. E. 24 (1914).
'Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1355 (I. B. 1762).
"State Bank v. Cumberland Savings & Trust Co., 168 N. C. 605, 85 S. E.
5 (1915).
,It was so held in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Jacobs, 287 S.
W. 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926). (This decision loses much of its fbrce because
of the decision of First Nat. Bank of Goree v. Talley, 115 Tex. 591, 285 S. W.
612 (1926) to the effect that no check presented for payment falls within the

provisions of Section 137.)
'Rules of Practice and Procedure, after Plea of Guilty, Verdict or Finding of

Guilt, in Criminal Cases, 292 U. S. 661, 54 Sup. Ct. xxxvii, 78 L. ed. 1512
(1934).
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entry of the order below, as required by the rule, the court dismissed

2
his appeal for want of jurisdiction.
The federal courts follow the traditional distinction between criminal and civil contempts 3-the former being acts or omissions which are
affronts to the dignity and authority of the court, the latter, disobediences to orders of the court whereby the rights and remedies of
private parties in the course of litigation are impaired. 4 Criminal contempts are punishable by a fine payable to the government or imprisonment for a definite term. To the extent that a contempt is civil only,
the object of punishment, if it may be called punishment, is not vindicative but remedial. The defendant is coerced into complying with
the court's order by imprisonment until he does comply, or he may be
required to make amends to the injured party by paying a fine for
that party's benefit. A single act often constitutes both civil and criminal contempt and may be proceeded against as both in one proceeding.5 However, the character of the proceeding must be such as to
indicate to the defendant the type of contempt for which he is being
prosecuted and the character of the order which he may anticipate.
A purely civil proceeding will not support a punishment for criminal
contempt. 6 The character of the order determines the method by which
a contempt proceeding is reviewed. If punitive, it is reviewed as
a criminal contempt judgment; if remedial, as civil contempt.
Although contempt of court is not, in itself, considered a crime,7
it is an offense of a criminal nature, and a judgment imposing a punishment for criminal contempt is a criminal judgment for purposes of
review. 8 Originally criminal judgments of inferior federal courts, including punishments for criminal contempt, could not be reviewed as a
matter of right by appeal or writ of error in any appellate court.9 The
2

Wilson v. Byron Jackson Co., 93 F. (2d) 577 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
'In North Carolina all contempt proceedings are regulated by statute, no distinction being made between civil and criminal contempt. N. C. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1935) §§978-986. But in most jurisdictions the distinction is preserved.
"See In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448, 458 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902) ; Beale, Contezpit of
Court, Criminal and Civil (1908) 21 HARv. L. REv. 161; note (1936) 46 YALE
L. J. 326.
'Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., 190 Fed. 565 (C. C. A. 1st, 1911); see
Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 329, 24 Sup. Ct. 665, 667, 48 L. ed. 997,
1002 (1904); Phillips Sheet and Tin Plate Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Iron,
Steel, and Tin Workers, 208 Fed. 335, 340 (S. D. Ohio, 1913).
6Gompers v. Buck's Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418, 31 Sup. Ct. 492,
55 L. ed. 797 (1911); McCann v. New York Stock Exchange, 80 F. (2d) 211
(C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
"Myers v. United States, 264 U. S. 95, 44 Sup. Ct. 272, 68 L.-ed. 577 (1924).
'O'Neal v. United States, 190 U. S. 36, 23 Sup. Ct. 776, 47 L. ed. 945 (1903);
Bessette
v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 24 Sup. Ct. 665, 48 L. ed. 997 (1904).
9
E parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, 5 L. ed. 391 (U. S. 1822) ; New Orleans v.
N. Y. Mail S. S. Co., 20 Wall. 387, 22 L. ed. 354 (U. S. 1874) ; Hayes v. Fischer,
102 U. S. 121, 26 L. ed. 95 (1880).
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only methods of review were by habeas corpus proceedings' ° and by
certiorari." A writ of habeas corpus could be used, not as a substitute
for a writ of error, but only to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial
court ;12 and the grant of a writ of certiorariby the Supreme Court was,
of course, discretionary. The circuit courts of appeal, when created,
were given jurisdiction to review judgments in criminal cases and may,
therefore, review a criminal contempt judgment.'3
Originally the
proper method of reviewing such judgments in those courts was by writ
of error.' 4 If the defendant sought to appeal, his appeal was dismissed.' 5 A statute enacted in 1916, however, required appellate courts
to disregard the mistake when an appeal was resorted to instead of a
writ of error and to make such disposition of the case as would be
appropriate under the correct appellate procedure.' 6 More recently the
writ of error has been abolished,' 7 and the method of seeking review
is now by appeal,' 8 but procedure in criminal appeals is substantially the
same as it was under the old writ of error. The appellate court reviews
questions of law presented by the bill of exceptions and assignment of
errors.19 There is no review of the trial court's finding of facts,20
and the sufficiency of the evidence can only be considered when there
has been a motion for directed verdict, denied, and exception taken.2 '
The new Supreme Court rules governing criminal appeals are the
latest development in appellate procedure with reference to criminal
%0Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, 5 L. ed. 391 (U. S. 1822) ; Ex parte Lange,
18 Wall. 163, 21 L. ed. 872 (U. S. 1874); Ex pare Hudgings, 249 U. S. 378,
39 Sup. Ct. 337, 63 L. ed. 656 (1919) (Supreme Court may still consider legality
of imprisonment for contempt by habeas corpus proceedings).
'Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall. 163, 21 L. ed. 872 (U. S. 1874) (certiorari used
in connection with writ of habeas corpus to determine legality of imprisonment
for criminal offense) ; Ex parte Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443, 17 Sup. Ct. 385, 41
L. ed. 782 (1897) (certiorari allowed, after creation of circuit courts of appeal,
to enable Supreme Court to review criminal contempt proceeding); Re Watts,
190 U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 718, 47 L. ed. 933 (1903).
'Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38, 5 L. ed. 391 (U. S. 1822) ; In re Lennon,
166 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 658, 41 L. ed. 1110 (1897); In. re Nevitt, 117 Fed.
448 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902).
" Bessette v. Conkey Co., 194 U. S. 324, 24 Sup. Ct 665, 48 L. ed. 997

(1904).

1, Grant v. United States, 227 U. S. 74, 33 Sup. Ct. 190, 57 L. ed. 426 (1913);

Brown v. Detroit Trust Co., 193 Fed. 622 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912); Gill v. United
States, 262 Fed. 503 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919).
"Grant v. United States, 227 U. S. 74, 33 Sup. Ct. 190, 57 L. ed. 423 (1913).
1639 STAT. 727 (1916)
(inoperative since abolition of writ of error).
"45 STAT. 54 (1928) as amended 45 STAT. 466 (1928), 28 U. S. C. A. §§861a,
861b (Supp. 1937).
3Ibid.

" Binkley v. United States, 282 Fed. 244 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922); Reeder v.
Morton-Gregson Co., 296 Fed. 785 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924).
'Keeney v. United States, 17 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927); Burneson
v. United States, 19 F. (2d) 780 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927); Woodside v. United

States. 60 F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).

1 Kubik v. United States, 57 F. (2) 477 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932) ; Woodside v.
United States, 60 F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932).
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contempts. These rules were promulgated pursuant to an act of congress 22 authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice
and procedure in criminal cases in district courts "with respect to any
and all proceedings after verdict, or finding of guilt by the court if a
jury has been waived, or plea of guilty". The rules, themselves, state
23
that they are applicable to the proceedings enumerated in the statute.
Proceedings for criminal contempt in which a jury trial is provided
by statute 24 clearly come within the scope of the rules. But in ordinary
criminal contempt cases there is no right to trial by jury which can
be waived, and there is no verdict. If the defendant does not plead
guilty, it is difficult to see how the proceeding comes within the scope
of the rules or the statute authorizing them. On the other hand, criminal contempt proceedings, for purposes of review, have always been
treated exactly as other criminal proceedings in the federal courts. There
seems to be no reason why a set of rules should apply to criminal cases
generally and to contempt proceedings in which there is a right to trial
by jury or where there is a plea of guilty, leaving other criminal contempt proceedings in a class by themselves; and the failure of congress to mention ordinary criminal contempt proceedings specifically in
the statute authorizing the new rules appears to have been an oversight.
The principal case holds that, by reason of the statement in the second
paragraph of the statute that "the rules made as herein authorized may
provide the time for and the manner of taking appeals", the rules are
applicable to a criminal contempt proceeding in which there is neither
right to jury trial nor plea of guilty. The result is highly desirable, but
the reasoning is not persuasive. A clarifying amendment to the statute
and to the rules would be helpful.
A proceeding for civil contempt alone is considered a proceeding
in the main suit as an incident to which the contempt occurred. 25 In
the federal courts it has always been subject to review in connection
with the main suit, formerly by writ of error or appeal to the Supreme
Court,26 and now by appeal to the circuit court of appeals 27 with no
right to review in the Supreme Court in most cases except by certiorari.28 A civil contempt may occur either in connection with an action

147 STAT. 904 (1933)'as amended' 48 STAT. 399, 926 (1934), 28 U. S. C. A.
§723a (Supp. 1937).
1 See note 1, supra.

"38 STAT. 738 (1914), 28 U. S. C. A. §§386, 387 (1928) (giving right to
trial by jury in contempt cases when alleged act of contempt also constitutes a
crime); 47 STAT. 72 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §111 (Supp. 1937) (providing trial
by jury in contempt proceedings for violating labor injunctions).
'Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14, 7 Sup. Ct. 814, 30 L. ed. 853 (1887);
Norstrom v. Wahl, 41 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930).
'Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14, 7 Sup. Ct. 814, 30 L. ed. 853 (1887).
= Clements v. Coppin, 72 F. (2d) 796 (C. C. A. 9th, 1934).
Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U. S. 105, 57 Sup. Ct. 57, 81 L. ed. 67 (1936).
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at law or a suit in equity, an example of the former being disobedience
to a writ of mandamus, 29 of the latter, the violation of an injunction.3°
Before the abolition of the writ of error, that method of review was resorted to if the contempt occurred in an action at law,3 1 an appeal being
taken if in equity.3 2 Although the writ of error has been'abolished, 83 the
appellate court must still restrict itself to questions of law if the proceedings below were at law, whereas it may review findings of fact if
the proceedings were in equity.3 4 A proceeding for civil contempt
resulting from disobedience to an order of a bankruptcy court, such as
an order to turn over property, is now reviewable by appeal, 35 although formerly only by petition to revise. 86 It is a "proceeding" in
bankruptcy within the meaning of Section 24(b) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 7 and the appeal is to be allowed only in the discretion of the
circuit court of appeals.38
In general, an appellate court has no jurisdiction to review a contempt order unless it is final.3 9 One exception to the rule, however, is
found in the discretion of the circuit courts of appeals under Section
24(b) of the Bankruptcy Act to review certain types of interlocutory
proceedings, including contempt proceedings for violating an interlocutory order of the bankruptcy court. 40 In a receivership, on the other
hand, a commitment for civil contempt in disobeying a "turnover" order
is interlocutory and may not be appealed,4 ' although the same type of
proceeding in a bankruptcy court might be subject to appeal. A judgment of criminal contempt is always final and presents no jurisdictional
problem on that score. Likewise, when the party being proceeded against
for civil contempt in violating an injunction, whether permanent or
temporary, is not a party to the original suit in equity, the decree is
I In re Nevitt, 117 Fed. 448 (C. C. A. 8th, 1902).

'Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., 190 Fed. 565 (C. C. A. 1st, 1911).
"IInternational Paper' Co. v. Chaloux, 165 Fed. 436 (C. C. A. 1st, 1908)

(appeal improper when contempt occurred and was punished in action at law).

'Heller

v. Nat. Waistband Co., 168 Fed. 249 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909) (writ

of error dismissed, appeal being proper method
proceedings were in equity).
'See
Robie v. Hart, Schaffner, and Marx, 40 F.
(effect of abolition of writ of error was change

of review when civil contempt
note 17, supra.
(2d) 871 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930)
in name only) ; Burns Bros. v.

Cook Coal Co., 42 F. (2d)" 109 (C. C. A. 3d, 1930) (to same effect).

=Ahlstrom v. Ferguson, 29 F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
m30 STAT. 553 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. §47(b) (1927) (before amendments of

1926), Kirsner v. Taliafero, 202 Fed. 51 (C. C. A. 4th, 1912), Freed v. Central

Trust Co., 215 Fed. 873 (C. C. A. 7th, 1914).
'130 STAT. 553 (1898) as amended 44 STAT. 664 (1926) as amended 48 STAT.

926 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. §47(b) (Supp. 1937), Ahlstrom v. Ferguson, 29
F. (2d) 515 (C. C. A. 1st, 1928).
Ibid.
Doyle v. London Guarantee and Accident Co., Ltd 204 U S 599, 27 Sup.

Ct. 313, 51 L. ed. 641 (1907).
'See note 3, supra.
"Mearns v. Sullivan, 262 Fed. 633 (App. D. C. 1920).
'Union

Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107, 42 Sup. Ct. 427, 66 L. ed. 848

(1922); Brown v. Detroit Trust Co., 193 Fed. 622 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912); Gill
v. United States, 262 Fed. 503 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919).
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final as to him and may be appealed at once for the reason that, not
being a party to the main suit, the defendant is not in a position to
appeal from the final decree in that action. 43 When a defendant in a
suit in equity violates a temporary injunction or restraining order and a
fine is imposed for the plaintiff's benefit or he is committed to prison
until he shall comply with the court's order, the decree is interlocutory
and not subject to appeal. 44 The defendant may, however, wait and
appeal from the final decree in the main suit, and in that appeal the final
decrees, including those of contempt, will
decree and all interlocutory
45
be subject to review.
What happens when a defendant violates a temporary injunction, is
found guilty of contempt, and the contempt order punishes him for
criminal contempt and also requires him to pay a fine for the injured
party's benefit? If the order were wholly criminal it would be final
and subject to appeal at once; if wholly remedial, it would be interlocutory and not appealable. The principal case holds that the criminal element dominates, and the order is at once subject to appeal. This rule
seems to be too well established to be open to serious attack. On two
occasions when exactly the same problem arose the Supreme Court
granted writs of mandamus to compel the circuit court of appeals to
review by writ of error, as in criminal cases, contempt orders of the
district court which were both punitive and remedial. 40 In a third
case both punitive and remedial fines were imposed upon the defendant
for contempt in violating a temporary injunction. The circuit court
of appeals reviewed the order of the lower court by writ of error and
cross writ of error, reversed the order so far as it was punitive, but
increased the amount of the fine payable to the plaintiff. In sustaining
the circuit court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that the criminal
features of the order fixed the character of the proceeding for purposes
order, criminal and civil, being properly
of review, every part of the
4
before the appellate court. 7
It may seem somewhat strange and objectionable that a punitive
fine of $125 which is almost trivial as compared with the remedial fine
of $1,044 in the principal case should determine the character of the
'Shuler v. Raton Waterworks Co., 247 Fed. 634 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917); cf.

Flower v. McGinnis, 112 Fed. 377 (C. C. A. 2d, 1901).
"Hayes v. Fischer, 102 U. S. 121, 26 L. ed. 95 (1880) ; see In re Christensen
Engineering Co., 194 U. S. 458, 460, 24 Sup. Ct: 729, 731, 48 L. ed. 1072, 1075
(1904); Re Merchants' Stock and Grain Co., 223 U. S. 639, 641, 32 Sup. Ct.
339,0 340, 56 L. ed. 584, 585 (1912).
Worden v. Searls, 121 U. S. 14, 7 Sup. Ct. 814, 30 L. ed. 853 (1887).
'4inre Christensen Engineering Co., 194 U. S. 458, 24 Sup. Ct. 729, 48 L. ed.
1072 (1904); Re Merchants' Stock and Grain Co., 223 U. S. 639, 32 Sup. Ct.
339, 1 56 L. ed. 584 (1912).
' Union Tool Co. v. Wilson, 259 U. S. 107, 42 Sup. Ct. 427, 66 L. ed. 848
(1922).
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order and the method of appeal. There are -three possible rules which
might be substituted for the rule established by the Supreme Court
and followed in the principal case: (1) the civil and criminal issues might
be split and reviewed by separate appeals, (2) the civil element might
be considered dominant so that there could be no appeal except from
a final decree in the equity suit, and (3) the dominant element in each
order might be determined by a consideration of the primary purpose
of the proceeding below and of the relative severity of the punitive element as contrasted with the remedial or. civil elements. The first substitute has little to commend it. Separate appeals might often lead to inconsistent results, and in the interest of economy and administrative
efficiency, it would be better to settle the whole matter in one appeal,
regardless of how taken. The disposition of the problem under the
second is subject to all the criticism that might be directed at the
rule that has been adopted. Were the remedial element of the contempt order insignificant as compared with the punitive element, it
would be at least as objectionable to require the defendant to wait for a
final decree in the suit in equity before appealing as it is, in a situation
like that in the principal case where the punitive element is relatively
insignificant, to permit an appeal from the whole order at once. Furthermore, to delay the appeal from a contempt order which is criminal
in whole or in part runs counter to the established policy in the federal
courts of surrounding persons accused of criminal contempt with most
of the protections afforded those accused of crime,48 with the exception of trial by jury in ordinary contempt cases. The third substitute
is likewise subject to the last mentioned criticism of the second. If
adopted it would be productive of uncertainty and inefficiency. The
only method by which defendants could determine with certainty the
dominant element in their cases would be by appealing all cases at
once, as if the criminal element were dominant. If the appellate court
should find the criminal element dominant no harm would be done,
but if it should find otherwise the appeal would necessarily be dis'Defendant in criminal contempt proceedings is presumed innocent until
proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt Jones v. United States, 209 Fed. 58S
(C. C. A. 7th, 1913);, Blim v. United States, 68 F. (2d) 484 (C. C. A. 7th"
1934) ; see note L. R. A. 1917B 118, 122. Defendant cannot be compelled to
give testimony against himself. See Gompers v. Buck's Stove and Range Co.,
221 U. S. 418, 443, 31 Sup. Ct. 492, 499, 55 L. ed. 797, 807 (1911) ; 4 WIGMORE,

EVIDNcE (1923) §2257(3); -kote L. R. A. 1917B 118 (indicating split of authority in state courts). There is no appeal from a judgment for the defendant
in criminal contempt cases. United States ex rel. West Va.-Pittsburg Coal Co.
v. Bittner, 11 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); Wingert v. Kieffer, 29 F. (2d)
59 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928).

Defendant may have adverse judgment reviewed. See

notes 13, 14, and 18, supru Criminal contempts may be pardoned by the president. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 45 Sup. Ct. 332, 69 L. ed. 527 (1925).
Statute of Limitations for criminal prosecutions applies to criminal contempt
proceedings. Gompers v. United States, 233 U. S. 604, 34 Sup. Ct. 693, 58 L. ed.
1115 (1914).
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missed, the time of the court and the time and money of the litigants
having been wasted. The courts do well to adhere to the rule followed
in the principal case.

M. B. GiLLAM, JR.
Dower-jointure.
Husband, during coverture, bought a tract of land and had it conveyed for life to his wife, who accepted the deed and still owned the
property at his death. The heirs contested her petition to have dower
allotted out of her husband's other real estate on the ground that the
property given her during coverture amounted to a jointure and barred
her claim for dower. Held: The conveyance operated as a bar to her
right to claim dower since it was a jointure under a Virginia statute'
which provides, "if any estate, real or personal, intended to be in lieu
of dower, shall be conveyed or devised for the jointure of the wife,
such conveyance or devise shall bar her dower of the real estate, or
residue thereof, and every such provision by deed or will, shall be taken
to be intended in lieu of dower, unless the contrary intention plainly
appear in such deed or will, or in some other writing signed by the
' 2
party making the provision.
Jointure, under the common law, is a conveyance to a wife having
the following characteristics: It must (1) commence immediately upon
the death of the husband; (2) be an estate no smaller than for the wife's
life; (3) be made to herself and not in trust for her; (4) be expressed
to be in satisfaction of her whole dower and not a part; and (5) be
made before marriage.3 Jointure first arose in England when the practice of conveying land to uses became prevalent. 4 Under the common
law a wife could not have dower in the lands of her husband unless he
was seized of those lands, 5 and he was not so seized when the lands
1
VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) §5120.
'McDonald v. McDonald, 194 S. E. 709 (Va. 1938).
'1

CRUISE, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF REA,

PROPRTY (Rev. ed. 1849) 213;

GnxaER, UsES AND TRUSTS (3d ed. 1811) 326 et seq.; 1 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY (Enlarged ed. 1920) 790.
'1 CRUISE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 212; 1 THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1st e& 1924) 961. This practice arose as a means
of evading the strict rules of the common law regarding real property. GILBIET,
op. cit. supra note 3, at XLII. Under this practice "the estate was regularly
transferred by a common law conveyance to some person as trustee, and he at
law was the absolute owner of the property, so much so that the real owner
would have been deemed a trespasser had he entered without the authority
express or implied of the legal tenant. But in equity the legal tenant and his
heirs were by degrees considered the mere nominees of the person by whom the
estate was conveyed, and were deemed bound to execute all his directions in
regard to the estate." ibid.
'Mayburry v. Brien, 15 Pet. 21, 10 L. ed. 646 (U. S. 1841); CHALLIS,
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1911) 346; 1 CRUISE, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 165; 1 THOMPSON, op. cit. supra note 4, §805; 1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra
note 3,§208.
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were merely conveyed to his use.6 Consequently the parents of the
bride usually required the prospective bridegroom to have lands conveyed to the use of himself and his wife as joint tenants so that after
his death she would have, as a means of support, a life estate in this
property. 7 Then the Statute of 'Uses" vested the legal title in the holder
of the equitable title and the husband acquired seisin of lands in which
he had formerly held only an equitable interest. 9 Then, of course, the
wife by virtue of seisin in her husband, was entitled to dower in these
lands.' 0 However, in order to keep wives from enjoying both jointure
and dower, the statute provided that no woman who had jointure should
The courts, for the purpose of safeguarding and
also have dower.'
protecting the wife's historical right to dower,1 2 were very strict in their
application of this last provision and would allow no conveyance to
operate as a jointure unless it had the five requisites set forth above.' 3
The courts of this country usually hold that a contract to accept some
settlement in lieu of dower is binding if based on sufficient consideration and validly assented to by the wife.1 4 A post-nuptial settlement
which is expressly, or by necessary implication, intended as a jointure
will force the wife to elect whether she will take the settletnent or her
dower.' 5 However, in the absence of any express or implied intention
that the post-nuptial conveyance shall be in lieu of dower it is held by
a majority of the courts to be a mere gift and does not put the wife to
her election.16
I1
72

CRUISE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 287; 1 TwAmY, op. cit. supra note 3, §226.
BL CoMm. *137; 1 CRUISE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 212; GLBERT, op. cit.

supra note 3, at 322; 1 TFANY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 789.
' Statute of Uses, 1536, 27 HEN. VIII, c. 10.
91 CRUISE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 212; GILB.RT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 149;
1 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 798.
" See note 8, supra; 1 CRUISE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 212; 1 TIFFANY,
op. cit. supra note 3, §226.
uSee note 8, supra; GILBERT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 325; 1 TIFFANY, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 790.
21 CRuIsE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 213, 214.
21
CRUISE, op. cit. supra note 3, at 213; GILBERT, op. cit. supra note 3, at
326 et seq.; 1 TFFANY, op. cit. supra; note 3, at 790.
"Andrews

v. Andrews, 8 Conn. 79 (1830); Lively v. Paschal, 35 Ga. 218

(1866); Merki v. Merld, 212 Ill. 121, 72 N. E. 9 (1904); Edwards v. Edwards,
267 Il. 111, 107 N. E. 874 (1915); Randles v. Randles, 63 Ind. 93 (1878);

Redwine's Ex'r et al. v. Redwine, 160 Ky. 282, 169 S. W. 864 (1914) ; Hill v.
Boland, 125 Md. 113, 93 At!. 395 (1907) ; Rhoades v. Davis, 51 Mich. 306 (1883) ;
Wright v. Wright, 79 Mich. 527, 44 N. .W. 944 (1890); Dakin v. Dakin,
97 Mich. 284, 56 N. W. 562 (1893); Fennell's Estate, 207 Pa. 309, 56 At!. 875
(1904) ; Taylor v. Moore, 2 Rand. 563 (Va. 1824).
2"Edwards v. Edwards, 267 Ill. 111, 107 N. E. 874 (1915); Mannan v.
Mannan et al., 154 Ind. 9, 55 N. E. 855 (1899); Yancy v. Smith, 59 Ky. 408
(1859); Tevis' Ex'r v. McCreary, 60 Ky. 151 (1860); Roberts v. Walker, 82
Mo. 200 (1884) ; Spangler v. Dukes, 34 Ohio St. 642 (1884) ; Jacobs v. Jacobs,
100 W. Va. 585, 131 S. E. 449 (1926).
"Mitchell v. Ward, 60 Ga. 525 (1878); Yancy v. Smith, 59 Ky. 408 (1859);
Pepper v. Thomas, 85 Ky. 539 (1887); Bubier v. Roberts, 49 Me. 460 (1862);
Grossnickle v. Grossnickle, 139 Md. 1, 114 At. 725 (1921) ; Perry v. Perryman,
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The principal case involved the construction of a Virginia statute
regulating jointure. The majority of the court seemed to holdt that because the legislature omitted from the revisal of 184917 the words "to
take effect in her own possession immediately upon the death of her
husband" (which words were present in the statute before that time)
it intended to redefine the word "jointure" and to provide that any gift
made to the wife during coverture, whether to take effect presently or
on the death of the husband, should operate as a jointure and force the
wife to elect whether she would take the gift or her dower. However,
a more logical explanation of the omission seems to be that the legislators regarded these words as mere surplusage since the statute contains
the words "for the jointure of the wife" and jointure has, ever since
the Statute of Uses, been said to "take effect in profit and possession
8
presently after the death of the husband."'

Since the word "jointure" has usually been given a strict and technical meaning in order to protect the wife's right to share in her husband's property at his death, and dower has always been a favorite of
the law,19 it seems that the Virginia court should have followed the
dissent, which construed the word according to its accepted meaning
and held that a gift from husband to wife could not operate as a jointure, unless the conveyance were to take effect in profit and possession
upon the death of the husband.

J.

NATHANIEL HAMRICK.

Gaming-Illegal Slot Machines-"Silent Salesman."
P, manufacturer of vending machines bearing the copyright name
"Silent Salesman", sought to enjoin interference by the police in the
use of these devices. P's complaint described an instrument which
19 Mo. 469 (1854); Swaine v. Perine, 5 Johns. Ch. 482 (N. Y. 1821). See
Cowdrey v. Cowdrey, 72 N. J. Eq. 951, 952, 67 Atl. 111 (1907) "The gift of a

husband to his wife of land does not ipso facto, bar her dower in the husband's
remaining real estate. So any provision for an equitable jointure, which operates
to put the widow upon her election, must be either expressly in lieu of dower or
the same instrument must make a disposition of some part of the estate which is
clearly inconsistent with the existence of dower therein, so that, in claiming dower
the widow would defeat, interrupt or disappoint some provision of the instrument."
"'VA.CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) §5120.
' SHUMAKER AND LONGSDORF, CycLoPEDIC LAW DICrIONARY (Cahill's ed.
1922) 599. Also the Virginia court stated by way of dictum in a previous
case, Land v. Shipp, 98 Va. 284, 291, 36 S. E. 391, 394 (1900), in construing
the present statute, that "sections 2270 and 2271 of the code as to jointure differ
from jointur6 at common law only in that, under the statute it may be of
personal as well as real estate."
"See Frazer v. Stokes, 112 Va. 335, 340, 71 S. E. 545, 547 (1911) "It is a
general maxim that the law favors dower, and as we have held in Lewis v.
Apperson, 103 Va. 624, 49 S. E. 987, 106 Am. St. Rep. 903, 68 L. R. A. 867,
a widow will not be deprived of her dower as a rule, unless .it is barred by the
statutory requirements for that purpose."

NOTES AND COMMENTS
vended a package of mints when the operator deposited a nickel in a
slot and pulled a lever on the machine. In addition, the user received
from time to time a varying number of tokens, each worth five cents
in trade. The number of these tokens returned on each operation was
designated in advance of the play by an indicator on the face of the
machine. A metal plate on the mechanism forbade successive "purchases" by the same user, and the owner of the instruments contracted
with the lessees thereof that tokens received in violation of this stipulation were not to be redeemed in trade. When tokens were replayed
into the machine no mints were vended. D, police, did not defend
the action. On the strength of P's complaint, the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina granted an injunction.'. Subsequently the case was reopened and evidence was introduced to the effect that the mints vended were comparatively valueless, that the users of the machine did not observe the restrictions of
the metal plate, and that all tokens were redeemed regardless of how
acquired. Whereupon, the court, setting aside the injunction, held 2
that the instruments were inherently mischievous notwithstanding the
no successive purchase plates which were "ineffectual for all practical
purposes", and that the devices contravened chapter 196 of the North
Carolina Public Laws of 1937.3
The simplest type of slot machine which has attracted marked attention is one which vends mints, gum, or similar merchandise, and at
unpredictable intervals coin or trade tokens. The user supposedly gets
value received in the form of merchandise regardless of whether tokens
are issued. General statutes prohibiting gaming devices have sufficed
to ban this type of instrument.4 It is not essential that there be chance
of loss to the user as well as chance of gain; that either party, user or
owner, risks loss is enough. 5 That the trade checks were used only
to stimulate business is no defense.0 Likewise, the courts have cast
'Morris v. Madrin, D. C. E. D. N. C., Dec. 2, 1937.
Morris v. Madrin, D. C. E. D. N. C., Feb. 15, 1938.
'N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §4437(t).
'State v. Vasquez, 49 Fla. 126, 38 So. 830 (1905); Conners v. Springfield,
130 I1. App. 240 (1906); State v. Doe, 221 Iowa 1, 263 N. W. 529 (1935);
Allen v. Commonwealth, 178 Ky. 250, 198 S. W. 897 (1917); Commonwealth
v. Gritten, 180 Ky. 446, 202 S.W. 884 (1918); Enloe v. Lawson, 146 Ore. 621,
31 P. (2d) 171 (1934); Meeks v. State, 74 S.W. 910 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903);
Salt Lake City v. Doran, 42 Utah 401, 131 Pac. 636 (1913) ; State v. Gaughan,
55 W. Va. 692, 48 S. E. 210 (1904). Accord: Meyer v. State, 112 Ga. 20,
37 S.E. 96 (1900) ; Lang v. Merwin, 99 Me. 486, 59 AtI. 1021 (1905) ; Territory
v. Jones, 14 N. M. 579, 99 Pac. 338 (1908); Moore v. Adams, 91 S. W. (2d)
447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
Meyer v. State, 112 Ga. 20, 37 S.E. 96 (1900) ; Lang v. Merwin, 99 Me. 486,
59 Atl. 1021 (1905) ; State v. Apodoca, 32 N. M. 80, 251 Pac. 389 (1926) ; State
v. McTeer, 129 Tenn. 535, 167 S.W. 121 (1914) (the machines involved in last
two cases vere slightly different, but cases are directly in point on this question).
' State v. Apodoca, 32 N. M. 80, 251 Pac. 389 (1926).
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aside arguments that the devices are merely a method of distribution
to players of profits earned by the owners in avoiding clerk hire
by use of the selling machine.7 The answer to this is that the so-called
distribution is no normal trade rebate based on the amount of purchases or plays, but is founded purely on chance.
Manufacturers resorted to a stratagem by introducing an indicator
on the machines which informed the operator before each play whether
any tokens would be returned, and if so how many. Ostensibly, the
element of chance had been removed. Only one decision. 8 reversed
on appeal, 9 sustained that ruse. With the exception of this case, the
courts unanimously see through the artifice, realizing that the element
of chance is only once postponed-the user hazarding his money in the
hope that the indicator will favor him on the next play. Here, too,
catch-all statutes prohibiting gaming devices, 10 as well as more particularized enactments,"' serve to stamp these instruments as illegal.
The mechanism described in the principal case represents the logical
development of these simple "predictable" machines whose illegality
was due to their allowance of successive operations by the same player.
Forbidding such manipulation by plates on the machines was designed
12
to remedy this difficulty. The principal case and one other opinion
consider this move but a sham to hide the essentially gaming nature of
the instruments. These decisions frankly scoff at the efficacy of such
language to prevent consecutive plays even if the owner of the machine
T

Sheetz v. State, 156 Ark. 255, 245 S. W. 815 (1922)

(machine involved was

slightly different, but case directly in point on this question).

8 Byk v. Enright, 203 N. Y. Supp. 296 (Sup. Ct. 1924).

'Byk v. Enright, 208 App. Div. 850, 204 N. Y. Supp. 897 (2d Dep't 1924),
aff'd, 240 N. Y. 699, 148 N. E. 764 (1975).
10 Cases arising under such statutes are: Gardner v. Daugherty, 10 F. (2d) 373
(E. D. Mich. 1925); Cagle v. State, 18 Ala. App. 553, 93 So. 206 (1922) ; Sheetz
v. State, 156 Ark. 255, 245 S. W. 815 (1922); Alexander v. Atlanta, 13 Ga.
App. 354, 79 S. E. 177 (1913); Brockett v. State, 33 Ga. App. 57, 125 S. E.
513 (1924); Ferguson v. State; 178 Ind. 568, 99 N. E. 806 (1912); Welch v.
Commonwealth, 179 Ky. 125, 200 S. W. 371 (1918); Tonahill v. Molony. 156
La. 753, 101 So. 130 (1924) ; State v. Googin, 117 Me. 102, 102 Atl. 970 (1918) ;
Commonwealth v. McClintock, 257 Mass. 431, 154 N. E. 264 (1926); Moberly
v. Deskin, 169 Mo. App. 672, 155 S. W. 842 (1913) ; Marvin v. Sloan, 77 Mont.
174, 250 Pac. 443 (1926); Zaft v. Milton, 96 N. J. Eq. 576, 126 Ati. 29 (Ch.
1924) ; State v. Apodoca, 32 N. M. 80, 251 Pac. 389 (1926) ; State v. McTeer,
129 Tenn. 535, 167 S. W. 121 (1914); Queen v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. Rep. 173,
246 S. W. 384 (1922); Milwaukee v. Johnson, 192 Wis. 585, 213 N. W. 335
(1927); People ex rel. Verchereau v. Jenkins, 153 App. Div. 512, 138 N. Y.
Supp. 449 (3d Dep't 1912) semble.
'1 Cases arising under such statutes are: Pure Mint Co. v. LaBarre, 96 N.
J. Eq. 186, 125 Atl. 105 (Ch. 1924); Crippen, Sheriff, v. Mint Sales Co.. 139
Miss. 87, 103 So. 503 (1925) ; People v. Spitzig, 133 Misc. 508, 233 N. Y.
Supp. 228 (Co. Ct. 1929); State v. Johnson. 15 Okl. Cr. 460, 177 Pac. 926
(1919) ; Nelson v. State, 37 Okl. Cr. 90, 256 Pac. 939 (1927) ; Griste v. Burch,
112 S. C. 369, 99 S. E. 703 (1919).
12 State v. Certain Gambling Instruments and Apparatus, 46 R. 1. 347, 128
Atl. 12 (1925).
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desired this, which is plainly doubted. It is further pointed out that
there is nothing to prevent two persons collaborating to operate the
instrument indefinitely. 13 'In the only other case found which involved
these devices they were accepted at their face value and declared to
be legal.' 4
All of the above discussed machines involve the possibility of additional returns to the operator either in money or trade. Other machines
yield amusement as the sole return in addition to the usual gum or
mints. The tokens to be won are stamped "no value", and may be
replayed into the machine thereby causing vai-colored reels to revolve,
or a baseball game to progress, or some other display for the amusement
of the player to occur. Some of the machines have the familiar indicator denoting the number of tokens to be received on the next play.
Clearly the chance for additional amusement makes the instruments
illegal under statutes prohibiting playing for money or any other thing.15
Under general gaming enactments, and statutes which prohibit playing
for money or property, or prohibit playing for any valuable thing,
some courts consider the mechanism a subterfuge, and treat t.e tokens
as redeemable in practice in coin or merchandise, notwithstand.g their
markings to the contrary.' 6 Other tribunals assume that the tokens
may be used only for amusement, and are divided on the question
of whether or not this amusement is "property" or a "thing of value"
within the ban of the statutes. Those holding in the negative maintain that the amusement is of infinitesimal importance,' 7 and further
contend that even if amusement is technically a thing of value, the attention of courts and law officers should not be absorbed with such minor
infractions.'" On the other hand, it is reasoned, seemingly with more
13Ibid.
" State v. Krauss, 114 Ohio St. 342, 151 N. E. 183 (1926). The case was a
criminal prosecution. The court intimated that had the action been by the owner
to enjoin police interference an injunction would not have been granted.
"Ross v. Goodwin, 40 F. (2d) 535 (D. N. H. 1930); State ex reL Manchester v. Marvin, 211 Iowa 462, 233 N. W. 486 (1930) ; State v. Mint Vending
Machine No. 195084, 85 N'. H. 22, 154 Atl. 224 (1931).
Chambers, Mayor, v. Bachtel, 55 F. (2d) 851 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) ; Gaither
v. Cate, 156 Md. 254, 144 Atl. 239 (1928); Petition of Sup't of Police of
Phila. for Order to Destroy Gambling Implements, 113 Pa. Super. 520, 173
Ad. 753 (1934); Commonwealth v. Heiland, 113 Pa. Super. 534, 173 Atl. 759
(1934) ; Harvie v. Heise, 150 S. C. 277, 148 S. E. 66 (1928) ; Mills v. Browning,
59 S. W. (2d) 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
Novelty Co. v. Farrell, 3 F. Supp. 555 (D. Conn. 1933), aft'd, 64
"7Mills
F. (2d) 476 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); Mills Novelty Co. v. Bolan, 3 F. Supp. 968
(E. D. N. Y. 1933), aff'd, Mills Novelty Co. v. O'Ryan, 68 F. (2d) 1009 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1934), rev'd on; other grounds. O'Ryan v. Mills Novelty Co., 292
U. S. 609, 54 Sup. Ct. 779, 78 L. ed. 1469 (1934); Davies v. Mills Novelty
Co., 70 F. (2d) 424 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Kirk v. Morrison, 108 Fla. 144,
146 So. 215 (1933); Ex parte Overby, 43 Old. Cr. 400, 279 Pac. 523 (1929);
Overby v. Oklahoma City, 46 Old. Cr. 42, 287 Pac. 796 (1930).
's For a clear statement of this position see the dissenting opinion in Painter
v. State, 163 Tenn. 627, 45 S. W. (2d) 46 (1932).
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cogency, that the amusement must be valuable to the user to induce
him to patronize the machine rather than buy at the counter. 19 The
device is a lure to gaming impulses, and arguments concerning its comparative harmlessness should be addressed to legislatures, not courts. 20
Pin ball or marble games present a new element: skill on the part
of the user. These machines are operated by using a spring plunger
to propel balls onto a slightly inclined plane where they have a chance
to fall into numbered holes. A prize is awarded for scores above a
certain point. Experience enables the operator to gain higher scores if
the plane remains at the same angle and the plunger retains the same
tension. It is sometimes held that the element of chance inust pre21
dominate over that of skill to constitute a machine a game of chance.
2
2
This is found in pin ball games, largely because the owners of the
devices alter the inclination of the board and change the plunger tension
sufficiently often to negative any acquired skill of the operator, and
because guards around the scoring holes suffice to protect them from
most carefully executed shots. Of course, these instruments are often
held illegal under statutes specifically covering such machines without
the neccssity of showing that the element of chance predominates. 23
1
'Grecn v. Hart, 41 F. (2d) 855 (D. Conn. 1930); Boynton, Att'y Gen, of
Kan., v. Ellis, 57 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932) ; Boynton, Att'y Gen. of Kan.,
v. Mills Novelty Co., 60 F. (2d) 125 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932); Rankin v. Mills
Novelty Co., 182 Ark. 561, 32 S. W. (2d) 161 (1930); Howell v. State, 184
Ark. 109, 40 S. W'. (2d) 782 (1931); Sweat v. Daley, 116 Fla. 755, 156 So. 720
(1934) ; Jenner v. State, 173 Ga. 86, 159 S. E. 564 (1931) ; State v. Baitler, 131
Me. 285, 161 Atl. 671 (1932); Snyder v. Alliance, 41 Ohio App. 48, 179 N. E.
426 (1931) ; Painter v. State, 163 Tenn. 627, 45 S. W. (2d) 46 (1932) ; see Colbert v. Superior Confection Co., 154 Okla. 28, 30, 6 P. (2d) 791, 792 (1931).
A comparison of the cases in n. 17 with those in n. 19 shows that cases from the
same jurisdictions reach opposite results. Green v. Hart, supra, considers that a
Conn. statute bars these machines, but subsequently Mills Novelty Co. v. Farrell,
3 F. Supp. 555 (D. Conn. 1933) held them to the legal. A dictum by the Okla.
Sup. Ct. in Colbert v. Suerior Confection Co., supra, declaring the mechanisms
to be illegal would seem to overrule Ex parte Overby, and Overby v. Oklahoma
City, both supra note 17. Likewise, Sweat v. Daley, supra, indicates that the
Fla. court no longer considers the tokens to be without value, as was held in
Kirk v. Morrison, supra note 17.
' See note (1931) 22 J. CRIm. L. 282, 284.
2
United States v. McKenna, 149 Fed. 252 (W. D. N. Y. 1906); People
ex rel. Ellison v. Lavin, 179 N. Y. 164, 71 N. E. 753 (1904).
' Howle v. Birmingham, 229 Ala. 666, 159 So. 206 (1935) ; Shapiro v. Moss, 245
App. Div. 835, 281 N. Y. Supp. 72 (2d Dep't 1935); Milwaukee v. Burns, 274
N. W. 273 (Wis. 1937); see Times Amusement Corp. v. Moss, 160 Misc. 930,
934, 290 N. Y. Supp. 794, 799 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Adams v. Antonio, 88 S. W.
(2d) 503, 505 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
' Cases arising under such statutes are: Steed v. State, 189 Ark. 389, 72 S. W.
(2d) 542 (1934) ; Stanley v. State, 107 S. W. (2d) 532 (Ark. 1937) ; Smith v.
Harris, 267 Ky. 439, 102 S. W. (2d) 385 (1936) ; Commonwealth v. Bowman. 267
Ky. 602, 102 S. W. (2d) 382 (1936) ; Henry v. Kuney, 280 Mich. 188, 273 N. W.
442 (1937) ; Redd. v. Simmons. 175 Miss. 402, 167 So. 65 (1936) ; State v. Humphries, 210 N. C. 406, 186 S. E. 473 (1936) ; Times Amusement Corp. v. Moss,
160 Misc. 930, 290 N. Y. Supp. 794 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Adams v. Antonio. 88 S.
W. (2d) 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Roberts v. Gossett, 88 S. W. (2d) 507
(Tex Civ. App. 1935); Houghton v. Fox,'93 S. W. (2d) 781 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936) ; Barkley v. Conklin, 101 S. W. (2d) 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
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In the earlier cases questioning the legality of slot machines controlling statutes were very general in terminology. These, often passed
before the development of the "one armed bandit", listed several prohibited games and ended with the inclusive phrase: "and other devices
of chance." The doctrine of ejusdem generis was urged to be applicable, and thereby to exclude slot machines from the prohibition. Under
this doctrine general words following an enumeration of specific things
are restricted to things of the same kind as those specifically mentioned.
The courts have taken two divergent views, but have reached the same
result: that the instruments are included within the statute. Some say
ejusdem generis is inapplicable because the very games enumerated
are not of the same type. 24 Others, applying the doctrine, reason that
games of chance are of two types: those wherein the player has an even
chance, and those wherein he does not; that the games listed are of
the latter type ;25 that slot machines are also; therefore that these de26
vices are illegal.
Are slot machines which may be used for gambling, gaming devices
per se? If so, the machines may be destroyed,27 and, according to some
cases, seized without warrants.2 s The decisions are split. Some maintain that the instruments lack inherent viciousness, and are not per se
gaming apparatus.&2 9 Others argue more realistically that they are
per se gaming devices as the only reasonable and profitable use to
which they may be put is in a game of chance.8 0
The form of the action may well be of importance. Frequently the
owners of slot machines seek to enjoin interference by the police in the
operation of such devices. Several decisions have held that an injunction will not lie until a criminal court has held that the instruments
' Conners v. Springfield, 130 111. App. 240 (1906) ; Salt Lake City v. Doran,
42 Utah 401, 131 Pac. 636 (1913).
'Games typically enumerated are: faro, pass-faro, pass-monte, twenty-one,
roulette, chuck a luck, and hazard.
I Territory v. Jones, 14 N. M. 579, 99 Pac. 338 (1908); Zaft v. Milton,
96 N. J. Eq. 576, 126 At. 29 (Ch. 1924); State v. Gaughan, 55 W. Va. 692,
48 S. E. 210 (1904).

2 Howell v. State, 184 Ark. 109, 40 S. W. (2d) 782 (1931) ; Steed v. State,

189 Ark. 389, 72 S. W. (2d) 542 (1934); Stanley v. State, 107 S. W. (2d) 532

(Ark. 1937); Zaft v. Milton, 96 N. J. Eq. 576, 126 Atl. 29 (Ch. 1924).

2 Zaft v. Milton, 96 N. J. Eq. 576, 126 Atl. 29 (Ch. 1924)*;'Moore v. Adams,

91 S. W. (2d) 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935). But cf. Adams v. Antonio, 88
S. W. (2d) 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (injunction will lie to compel police to get
court order, as they may not be judge, jury, and executioner).

SAshcraft v. Healey, 23 F. (2d) 189 (C. C. A. 5th, 1927); State v. Derry,

171 Ind. 18, 85 N. E. 765 (1908)

(machine is capable of use as harmless article

of furniture); Soper v. Michal, 123 Md. 542, 91 Atl. 684 (1914) ; State v.
Stigler, 175 So. 194 (Miss. 1937); Kearney v. Elmira, 266 N. Y. Supp. 81 (3d

Dep't 1933) seible.
I Howell v. State. 184 Ark. 109, 40 S. W. (2d) 782 (1931) ; Steed v. State,
189 Ark. 389, 72 S. W. (2d) 542 (1934); Stanley v. State, 107 S. W. (2d) 532
(Ark. 1937) ; Zaft v. Milton, 96 N. J. Eq. 576, 126 AtI. 29 (Ch. 1924) ; Moore
v. Adams, 91 S. W. (2d) 447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
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are legal!" Even though no criminal action would lie, equity in its good
conscience may refuse injunctive relief because the machines are readily
adaptable to gaming,3 2 or because equity upon receiving evidence that
most slot machines are owned by racketeers, inadmissible in a criminal
action, does not feel disposed to act. 3 Where the action is in rein
to, condemn the instruments it is unnecessary to show that the owners
knew of the violation or had any intention that the machines be used
34
illegally.
Only two cases seem to have considered who is entitled to the money
found in a lawfully seized illegal instrument. 35 State v. Falgren0 held
that the owner of the machine was entitled as against the state; the
purpose of statutes allowing seizure being the destruction of the machine, not governmental enrichment. Dorrell v. Clark,87 however, refused to secure to the transgressor of the law the fruits of his outlawry.
There the money was put aside for those who had lost it in the condemned device, but the court intimated that in as much as the money
constituted a retrieved portion of a destroyed machine it might perhaps
be considered as treasure trove, and be claimed by the state, which
33
found it.
North Carolina first legislated specifically against slot machines in
1923,39 defining as illegal all of these instruments which did not give the
same return in market value each and every time operated. In 1931
the legislature adopted4" this definition, and inserted the phrase "illegal
slot machines" into the general gaming statutes. 41 The 1935 assembly
twice defined these devices in vague and seemingly conflicting enactments. 42 The North Carolina Supreme Court construed the two statutes
together in State v. Humphries4" to mean that a machine was illegal
"Sweat v. Daley, 116 Fla. 755, 156 So. 720 (1924) ; Roberts v. Gossett, 88 S.W.
(2d), 507 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) ; Barkley v. Conklin, 101 S. W. (2d) 405 (Tex.

Civ. App. 1937).
'People v. Jennings, 257 N. Y. 196, 177 N. E. 419 (1931).
'Times Amusement Corp. v. Moss, 160 Misc. 930, 290 N. Y. Supp. 794

(Sup. Ct. 1936)
'State v. Doe, 221 Iowa 1, 263 N. W. 529 (1935) ; Enloe v. Lawson, 146 Ore.
621, 31 P. (2d) 171 (1934) ; State v. Certain Gambling Instruments and Apparatus, 46 R.I. 347, 128 Atl. 12 (1925) ; cf. Petition of Sup't of Police of Phila.
for Order to Destroy Gambling Implements, 113 Pa. Super. 520, 173 Ati. 753
(1934) (evidence does not have to be as great as in a criminal action).
"Statutes provide for this in some jurisdictions.
=176 Minn. 346, 223 N. W. 455 (1929).
8Id. at 592, 4 P. (2d) at 714.
"90 Mont. 585, 4 P. (2d) 712 (1931).
'N.C. Pub. Laws 1931, c. 14, §1.
"N. C. Pub. Laws 1923, c. 138.
(Michie,
1935)
§§4433,
4434, 4435. This makes the mean"N. C. CODE ANi.
Lag of these statutes ambiguous. They were designed to prohibit games of chance,
and allow those of skill, yet under its definition an illegal slot machine might
be a game of skill.
C N. C. Pub. Laws 1935, cc. 37, 282.
"210 N. C. 406, 186 S.E. 473 (1936). This was a three to two decision.
The dissent considered that the second enactment was designed to alleviate the
harshness of the former one by legalizing machines where the outcome of oper-
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when the result of its operations involved an element of chance even
though it was achieved partly by skill. The legislature in 1937 remedied
the uncertainty of earlier acts. This latest enactment4 4 is clear and very
inclusive. Protected by the statute are simple vending machines making the same return or returns of equal value on each and every play,
and only those devices, for if the user has a chance to receive anything
of value in addition to the customary merchandise vended, or to make
varying scores, or to replay the machine without charge, the instrument
is illegal. This act has recently been declared constitutional as within
the police power of the state. 45 Because of the carefully inclusive
terminology of the present statute, and because courts generally interpret
such acts liberally in favor of the state, clever slot machine manufacturers will be hard pressed to create an instrument appealing to the
gaming instinct which may be legally operated in North Carolina.
In view of this statute the principal case is undoubtedly correctly
decided. Indeed, the injunction might well have been refused in the
first instance. It should have been entirely unnecessary to show that
the restrictions imposed by the device itself were not followed, because,
assuming complete obedience to instructions, the machines would give
varying returns on different plays which is prohibited -by the 1937 act.
ROBERT C. HowIsoN,

JR.

Injunction--State Injunctions Against Federal
Judicial Proceedings.
The plaintiff employee of the defendant railroad, which was engaged in interstate commerce, was injured in the course of his employment. The accident happened in Virginia where the plaintiff lived and
the witnesses were available. The plaintiff brought suit against the
defendant under the Federal Employers' Liability Act' in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Thereafter the defendant obtained an injunction in a state court of Virginia
enjoining the employee from prosecuting the action in New York, on
the ground that to bring suit there was inconvenient and oppressive,
and intended to harass and vex the defendant employer, and that the
proper forum was in Virginia. Thereupon the plaintiff employee moved
in this action for an order enjoining the defendant from enforcing its
injunction, or from prosecuting that suit. Held, the decree sought does
ations was dependent in part on the skill of the player. However, a very recent
case, Tomberlin v. Bachtel, 213 N. C. 250 (1938), reasserts the view of the
majority.
"N. C. CoD ANN. (Michie, Supp. 1937) §4437(r)-(w).
' Calcutt v. McGeachy, 213 N. C. 1, 195 S. E. 49 (1938).

'35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. A. §51 (1934).
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not fall within the exceptions to the federal statutory prohibition against
the issuance of injunctions by federal courts against proceedings in state
courts. Both the federal suit and the state injunction litigation may go
along side by side. Order denied.2
The general rule appears well settled that one within the jurisdiction
of a court may be enjoined, on a proper showings from prosecuting an
action in another jurisdiction. 4 But the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, under which the plaintiff's original action was brought, confers on
the injured employee the privilege to sue the defendant employer in the
state or federal courts in any district in which the employer does business.6 Against the contention that this privilege is an absolute one,
most courts have held that, where the foreign action is in a state court,
the statutory privilege to sue is limited by the potential jurisdiction of
a state court of equity to enjoin a foreign action which would harass,
oppress, or defraud the defendant. 6 The reasoning of such cases is
that since it was allowable before the act to enjoin the plaintiff from
bringing his suit in a court and at a place where under the law he had
a right to bring it, it must be equally allowable to do so since the act,
because the act merely limits instead of enlarging the places where the
suit must be brought.
However, where the foreign action under the act is brought in a
federal court, the power of the state courts to enjoin the employee's
suit is disputed, 7 on the ground that to allow the injunction would be
to permit state interference with the jurisdiction of the federal courts
and with a federal right conferred upon the claimant by Congress. This
involves the exception to the general rule that equity may enjoin the
prosecution of foreign actions, namely, that, as between state and federal courts, neither may enjoin a person from bringing an action in the
other.8 A statute in 17939 forbade the issuance of injunctions by a
Brant v. Atlantic Coast Line 1. R., 92 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
What grounds constitute a proper showing is a question beyond the scope
of this note. Note (1934) 13 N. C. L. REv. 235.
'Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. ed. 538 (1890)
Allen v. Buchanan, 97 Ala. 399, 11 So. 777 (1892); 5 PosmoY, EQui'T' JuinsPRuDENcE (4th ed. 1919) §2091.
135 STAT. 66 (1908), 45 U. S. C. A. §56 (1934).
OEx parte Crandall, 53 F. (2d) 969 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied, 285
U. S. 540, 52 Sup. Ct. 312, 76 L. ed. 933 (1931); Reed v. Illinois C. R. 1., 182
Ky. 455, 206 S. W. 794 (1918); Kern v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. R., 204
Ind. 595, 185 N. E. 446 (1933). Accord: Re Spoo, 191 Iowa 1134, 183 N. W.
580 (1921); cf. Payne v. Knapp, 197 Iowa 737, 198 N. W. 62 (1923); Peterson
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 187 Minn. 228, 244 N. W. 823 (1932).
7 Chicago, M. & St. P. R. I. v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923);
McConnell v. Thomson, 8 N. E. (2d) 986 (Ind. 1937).
85 POMEROY, EQvrrY JuRIsPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) §§2061, 2062.

91 STAT. 334 (1793), 28 U. S. C. A. §379 (1934), as amended -by 36 STAT. 1162
(1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §379 (1934) (to permit injunctions in bankruptcy cases).
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federal court against proceedings' ° in state courts. In the first case
before it involving the converse of the situation, i.e., where the state
court had enjoined proceedings in a federal court, the Supreme Court
invoked broad principles of comity similarly to circumscribe the jurisdiction of state courts. 1 '
Subsequently, however, the Court found it expedient to evolve certain exceptions (discussed hereinafter) to the federal statute in order
to permit federal injunctions against state court proceedings under particular conditions. The statute has accordingly been declared to be not
a limitation on the powers of the federal court but merely on the exercise of its equitable powers.12 Whether the lack of "jurisdiction" in
the state courts to enjoin federal proceedings means a lack of power,
or merely that such a power should not be exercised, has never been
expressly adjudicated by the Supreme Court. Most of the language of
the Court's opinions would support the lack of power theory.13 Yet
14
some of the language would permit a contrary inference, and once the
15
Court cited with approval a state decision granting such an injunction.
"The theory behind the general rule that equity may enjoin the prosecution
of foreign actions is that the decree is directed against the defendant, and not
the foreign court. Therefore it is legally reasoned that there is no interference
with or supervision over the acts of a foreign tribunal. See note 4, supra. In an
early case, however, the Supreme Court declared that in the state and federal
court relationship, the fact that the decree was directed against the individual
defendant was merely a matter of -form, and that in effect such a decree enjoined
the proceedings in the other court. Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 625, 12 L. ed.
841, 846 (U. S. 1849). For convenience's sake reference is made in the text to
"injunctions against proceedings", though technically the decree enjoins the defendant from instituting or prosecuting proceedings in the foreign court.
n M'Kim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch 279, 3 L. ed. 342 (U. S. 1812).
" Smith v. Apple, 264 U. S. 274, 278, 44 Sup. Ct. 311, 313, 68 L. ed. 678,
681 (1924).
' McKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch 279, 3 L. ed. 342, 343 (U. S. 1812) (".
State court had no jurisdiction to enjoin a judgment of the circuit court of the
United States. . ."); Riggs v. Johnson County, 11 Wall. 166, 195, 18 L. ed.
768, 771 (U. S.1867) ("State Courts . . .are destitute of all power to restrain
either the process or proceedings in the National Courts") ; Amy v. The Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136, 137, 20 L. ed. 101, 102 (U. S. 1870) (".. . the [state
court] injunction was a nullity"); Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256, 268, 14
Sup. Ct. 1019, 1022, 38 L. ed. 981, 985 (1894) ("'. . . the injunction of a state
court is inoperative to control, or in any manner to affect the process or proceedings of a Circuit Court.. . "') ; Central Nat. Bank v. Stevens, 169 U. S.432,
460, 18 Sup. Ct. 403, 413, 42 L. ed. 807, 817 (1898) ("The exemption of the
authority of the courts of the United States from interference by . . . judicial
action of the States is essential to their independence and efficiency.").
"Central Nat. Bank v. Stevens, 169 U. S.432, 465, 18 Sup. Ct. 403, 415, 42 L.
ed. 807, 819 (1898) ("The judgments [granting a state injunction] are erroneous") ; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Lake St Elev. R. R., 177 U. S.'51, 61, 20 Sup.
Ct. 564, 568, 44 L. ed. 667, 671 (1900) ("As ... the jurisdiction of that [federal]
court had thus attached before the commencement of the suit in the state court,
it follows . . . that it was not competent for the state court to interfere by
injunction or otherwise with the proceedings in the Federal court.").
" Home Ins. Co. v. Howell, 24 N. J. Eq. 238 (Ch. 1873), cited with approval
in Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256, 271, 14 Sup. Ct. 1019, 1023, 38 L. ed. 981,

986 (1894).
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However, with this exception, prior to the prihcipal case, no decision
has been found in which a federal court even tacitly approved the issuance of such an injunction by a state court. The state courts have exercised that power occasionally. 16 Logically, it would seem that if the
federal statute is a limitation merely on the exercise of power by the
federal courts, the judicial limitation on state courts would be on the
exercise of power, and not on the existence of power. However, though
the relationship between state and federal courts is theoretically reciprocal, 17 that is not always the case. 18 One cannot but feel that in this
particular relationship the independence of the federal courts' sphere of
action has been much more zealously guarded than has the supposedly
corresponding independence of the state courts. A decision of the
Supreme Court denying the existence of power in the state court to enjoin federal proceedings would not come, then, as a complete surprise. 10
The assumption to the contrary in the principal case is out of line with
the trend of previous federal decisions.
Assuming, however, that the Virginia court had jurisdiction (in a
strict sense) of the suit for injunction, was its discretion properly exercised? The decree granted was an "original" 2 0 one to restrain an action
then pending in a federal court. Only one previous state decision is
authority for such a position. 21 The federal courts, in spite of the broad
exceptions to the prohibitory statute, are prevented by it from "origi'6Akerly v. Vilas, 15 Wis. 440 (1862); Home Ins. Co. v. Howell, 24 N. J.
Eq. 238 (Ch. 1873) ; Keith v. Alger, 114 Tenn. 1, 85 S.W. 71 (1905) ; Reagan v.
Dick, 76 Colo. 544, 233 Pac. 159 (1925) ; In re Dawley, 99 Vt. 306, 131 Atl. 847
(1926); Marchant v. Wannamaker, 176 S. C. 369, 180 S. E. 350 (1935); cf.
Hines & Hobbs v. Rawson, 40 Ga. 356 (1869).
" "Circuit courts and State courts act separately and independently of each
other, and in their respective spheres of action the process issued by one is as
far beyond the reach of the other, as if the line of division between them 'was
traced by landmarks and monuments visible to the eye."'

Riggs v. Johnson

County, 11 Wall. 166, 195, 18 L. ed. 768, 776 (U. S. 1867).
IRThe enforcement of the judgment of a state court may 'be enjoined by a
federal court, Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S. 589, 12 Sup. Ct. 62, 35 L. ed.
870 (1891), but a state court may not enjoin the enforcement of a federal judgment, M'Kim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch 279, 3 L. ed. 342 (1812). Other examples
of the influence of the "federalist" philosophy on the allocation of judicial powers
are: a state court may not issue mandamus to a federal official, McClung v.
Silliman, 6 Wheat 598, 5 L. ed. 340 (U. S. 1821), but a federal court may issue
mandamus to a county official, Gelpke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. ed.
520 (U. S. 1864) ; a state court possesses no power to remove any person from
the jurisdiction of federal officials or courts through the writ of habea.r corpus,
Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397, 20 L. ed. 597 (U. S. 1872), but a federal court has
the power to issue writs of habeas corpus wherever a person is in custody,
whether under state or federal authority, in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States, 14 STAT. 385 (1867), 28 U. S. C .A. §463 (1934).
"It is readily observed that this would be the most practicable means of
achieving the desired results-non-interference by state courts.
'The term "original", as distinguished from "ancillary", denotes a lack of
prior action in the same court to which the injunction might be considered
supplemental.

2Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Hughes, 11 Hun 130 (N. Y. 1877).
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nally" enjoining an action in a state court before rendition of judgment
(unless the action is to enforce an unconstitutional statute) .22 It is
hardly conceivable that state courts will be permitted to exercise greater
powers of interference than are granted to the federal courts. Therefore,
it seems fairly clear that, even assuming jurisdiction in the Virginia
court, its action was erroneous.
As its decree was erroneous, whether the Virginia court had jurisdiction seems, perhaps, just an academic question, but it is important
in determining the effect to be given that decree. The court in the principal case refused to give it extraterritorial effect, and permitted the
plaintiff to continue his suit in defiance of the Virginia court. While
this seems to be the majority rule, even where the injunction is jurisdictionally valid, 23 the more commendable minority view declines to
entertain the plaintiff's suit after the foreign court has been officially
informed of the injunction. 24 If the Virginia decree was merely erroneous, in view of the "full faith and credit" clause and, on principles of
comity it would be more desirable to accord it recognition.2 5 If, however, the Virginia court had no power, recognition was correctly refused
a decree that was a nullity. On the other hand, perhaps the plaintiff's
remedy was by appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia and thence by
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. Failure thus to
question the jurisdiction directly might foreclose any subsequent raising
of that issue.

26

After a refusal to recognize the state injunction, has the New York
federal court -power to block affirmatively that injunction by means of
a counter-injunction? Unless the counter-injunction falls within the
recognized exceptions, the federal statute would prohibit it. As the
cases by means of which the exceptions have become engrafted on the
' Essanay Film Co. v. Kane, 258 U. S. 358, 42 Sup. Ct. 318, 66 L. ed. 658

(1922).

State ex rel. Bossung v. District Court, 140 Minn. 494, 168 N. W. 589
(1918); Nichols & S. Co. v. Wheeler, 150 Ky. 169, 150 S. W. 33 (1912); Kepner
v. Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. R, 322 Mo. 299, 15 S. W. (2d) 825 (1929).
These decisions are based on the ground that, as the foreign tribunal would not
be allowed to control a citizen of the local state, as to bringing a transitory action
therein, the "privileges and immunities" clause of the Fourth Amendment requires
a similar rule as to non-residents. The basis for this reasoning was removed by the
Supreme Court's sanction of discretionary refusal of juridiction to non-residents.
Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 279 U. S. 377, 49 Sup. Ct. 355, 93
L. ed. 747 (1929). Though this rule is numerically the majority view, it has
been subjected to much criticism. See Note (1930) 39 YALE L. J.719.
24 Gilman v. Ketcham, 84 Wis. 60, 54 N. W. 395 (1893); Fisher v. Pacific
Mut. L. Ins. Co., 112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846 (1916); Allen v. Chicago Great
App. 38 (1925).
Western R. R., 239 Ill.
Note (1924) 22 MicH. L. Rav. 469.
"Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522, 51 Sup. Ct.
517, 75 L. ed. 1244 (1931); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156,
53 Sup. Ct. 98, 77 L. ed. 1244 (1932) ; Note (1932) 42 YALE L. J.427.
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statute apparently can not be reconciled,27 it is probably best to accept
the Supreme Court's version of the result of those cases. In Wells
Fargo & Co. v. Taylor,2 8 Mr. Justice VanDevanter stated the situation
thus: "[the statute] . .. does not prevent the federal courts from enjoining the institution in the state courts of proceedings to enforce local
statutes which are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, 29
... or prevent them from maintaining and protecting their own jurisdiction properly acquired and still subsisting, 80 ... or prevent them of
depriving a party ... of the benefit of a judgment obtained in a state
court where its enforcement will be contrary to recognized principles of
equity and the standards of good conscience." 8 1 The counter-injunction
sought by the plaintiff here seems to come squarely within the second
exception. The principal case, however, citing Kline v. Burke Construction Co.,3 2 declares that where the action in the state and in the
federal court are both in personam, there is no such conflict between
jurisdictions as would exist if a res were involved. Therefore the federal court, though its jurisdiction attached first, on authority of the
Kline case declares the statute prevents it from issuing an injunction to
protect that jurisdiction. The Kline case denied an injunction against
the state court proceedings where an in personam action was pending
in the federal court, and subsequently an in personam action was brought
in a state court on the same cause of action. The lack of a res was said
to permit both actions to go along side by side without conflict. Yet it
would seem that where the state court directly enjoined the federal proceedings, rather than merely entertained the same cause of action, there
would be a distinct conflict between the different jurisdictions, even
though both actions were in personam. Therefore, it follows that the
second exception stated by the Supreme Court would be applicable to
the situation at hand. As the federal court had prior jurisdiction over
the case, it would have the power to protect that jurisdiction by the
85
counter-injunction
'For

excellent surveys of these cases see Durfee and Sloss, Federal Iniunc-

tionts Against Proceedings in State Courts: The Life History of a Statute
(1932) 30 MICH. L. REv. 1145; Taylor and Willis, The Power of Federal Courts
to Enjoin Proceedingsin State Courts (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1169.

'254 U. S. 175, 183, 41 Sup. Ct. 93. 96, 65 L. ed. 205, 211 (1920).
Gunter v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 200 U. S. 273, 26 Sup. Ct. 252, 50 L. ed
477 (1906); Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 28 Sup. Ct. 441, 52 L. ed. 714
(1908); Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. ed. 131 (1915).
'French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250, 22 L. ed. 854 (U. S. 1875) ; Julian v. Central
Trust Co., 193 U. S. 93, 24 Sup. Ct. 339, 48 L. ed. 629 (1904); Looney V.
Tex. R. R., 247 U. S. 214, 38 Sup. Ct. 460, 62 L. ed. 1084 (1918).
Eastern
" 1Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U. S.589, 12 Sup. Ct. 62, 35 L. ed. 870 (1891)
Ex parte Simon, 208 U. S.144, 28 Sup. Ct. 238, 52 L. ed. 429 (1908); Simon
v. Southern Ry., 236 U. S.115, 35 Sup. Ct. 255, 59 L. ed. 492 (1915).
'260 U. S.226, 43 Sup. Ct. 49, 67 L. ed. 226 (1922).
'Libby Glass Co. v. McKee Glass Co., 216 Fed. 172 (W. D. Pa. 1914);
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Schendel, 292 Fed. 326 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923).
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411.

Had the court in the principal case issued the retaliatory injunction,
however, the results would have been quite undesirable. Besides a
situation that would smack of petty judicial squabbling, a jurisdictional
stalemate would have been effected. If the plaintiff continued his federal action, he would be in contempt of the Virginia court; if the defendant cited the plaintiff for contempt in Virginia, the defendant in turn
would be in contempt of the federal court. The court here wisely
exercised its discretion to prevent such unseemly results.
C. A. GRIFFIN, JR.
Labor Law-Anti-Injunction Statute-Definition
of a Labor Dispute.
Plaintiff maintained five meat markets in the city of Milwaukee,
employing about thirty-five persons. The defendants, officers and agents
of a labor union, demanded that the plaintiff require his employees, as
a condition of employment, to become members of the union. The
plaintiff willingly notified the employees that they were free to join if
they wished, but they refused to do so. The defendants thereupon
picketed the plaintiff's markets in an attempt to coerce him into compelling his employees, upon pain of dismissal, to join the union. In an
action seeking a decree enjoining such picketing, held, this is a "labor
dispute" within the terms of both the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction
Act' and the Wisconsin Labor Code,2 which limit the issuance of injunctions in labor controversies, and hence an injunction may not issue.3
This case represents the culmination of a lengthy fight by organized
labor against the use of the injunction in labor disputes. In 1914, after
a persistent battle on the part of the proponents of labor,4 Congress
passed the Clayton Act, 5 the famous Section 20 of which provided that:
"No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court
of the United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case
between an employer and employees, or between employers and
employees, or between employees, or between persons employed
and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a
dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless
necessary to prevent irreparable injury ......
70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§101-115 (Supp. 1937).
(1935) §103.51.
'Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 58 Sup. Ct. 578 (U. S. 1938).
' A number of bills intended to relieve labor of "government by injunction"
were introduced into Congress during the first decade of the present century, the
most notable of these being the Pearre Bill and the nearly identical Wilson Bill,
for which the Clayton Act was a substitute. See FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE
147 STAT.

'Wis.

STAT.

LABOR INJUNCTIOIT. (1930)

c. IV; WrrTE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DIspuTEs
16 MINN. L. REV. 638;

(1932); Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act (1933)
note (1936) 11 Wis. L. REv. 552.

538

STAT.

730 (1914), 29 U. S. C. A. §52 (1927).
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The history of the process of judicial emasculation whereby labor's
"Magna Charta"' was rendered nugatory is well known to the student
of labor law. One of the many loopholes which soon appeared in the
statute was afforded by the construction placed upon Section 20 by the
lower federal courts, i.e., that the act was applicable only to those disputes in which there existed between the disputants the relationship of
employee and employer.7 This construction received the sanction of
the Supreme Court in 19218 and has been consistently followed ever
since.9
The nullification of the Clayton Act by judicial decision led to the
passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act 10 in 1932. Congress, in an attempt to avoid the difficulties which the Clayton Act met
at the hands of the courts, has specified in this more recent legislation
the situations to which it shall be applicable as follows:
". . when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same
industry, trade, craft, or occupation; or have direct or indirect
interests therein; . . . whether such dispute is (1) between one or
'Note (1936) 84 U. oF PA. L. REv. 771.

' Dail-Overland Co. v. Willys-Overland, Inc., 263 Fed. 171 (N. D. Ohio 1920);
Vonnegut Machinery Co. v. Toledo Machine & Tool Co., 263 Fed. 192 (N. D.
Ohio 1920). These two cases went to thd extent of holding that the Clayton Act

was inapplicable to strikers whose places had been filled by strike-breakers, for
the "employer-employee" relationship 'was thereby terminated. See dissent of
Pitney, J., in Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S. 459, 484, 37 Sup. Ct. 718, 720,
61 L.
ed. 1256, 1265 (1917).
8
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65
L. ed. 349, 16 A. L. R. 196 (1921).
'American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184,
42 Sup. Ct. 72, 66 L. ed. 189, 27 A. L. R. 36Q (1921) ; Bedford Cut Stone Co. v.
Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522, 71 L. ed. 916, 54
A. L. R. 791 (1927); Buyer v. Guillan, 271 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Quinlivan v. Dail-Overland Co., 274 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921) ; Kinloch Tel. Co. v.
Local Union No. 2, 275 Fedi 241 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921); Central Metal Products
Corp. v. O'Brien, 278 Fed. 827 (N. D. Ohio 1922); Canoe Creek Coal Co. v.
Christinson, 281 Fed. 559 (W. D. Ky. 1922); United States v. Railway Employees' Dep't of A. F. of L., 283 Fed. 479 (N. D. Ill. 1922); Montgomery v.
Pacific E. Ry., 293 Fed. 680 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923); Waitresses' Union, Local No.
249 v. Benish Restaurant Co., Inc., 6 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925) ; Bittner
v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 15 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926);
Columbus Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Pittsburgh Bldg. Trades Council, 17 F.
(2d) 806 (W. D. Pa. 1927); Ferguson v. Peake, 18 F. (2d) 166 (App. D. C.
1927) ; Armstrong v. United States, 18 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927), cert.
denied, 275 U. S. 534 (1928); International Organization, United Mine Workers
of America v. Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 18 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A.
4th, 1927); Alco-Zander Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 35
F. (2d) 203 (E. D. Pa. 1929) ; United States Gypsum Co. v. Heslop, 39 F. (2d)
228 (N. D. Iowa 1930) ; see dissent of Manton, J., in Aeolian Co. v. Fischer, 29
F. (2d) 679, 682 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928).
2047 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §§101-119 (Supp. 1937). For an analysis
of the provisions of the act, see Fraenkel, Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and Yellow Dog Contracts (1936)- 30 ILL. L. REV. 854; Monkemeyer, Five
Years of the Norris-LaGuardiaAct (1937) 2 Mo. L. REV. 1; Riddlesbarger, The
Federal Anti-Injunction Act (1935) 14 ORE. L. REV. 242; Witte, The Federal

Anti-Injunction, Act (1932) 16 MiwN. L. Ray. 638; Notes (1935) 5

FORDHAM

REv. 125; (1932) 30 Micn. L. REv. 1257; (1934) 12 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 101.

L.
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more employers or associations of employers and one or more employees or associations of employees; (2) between ... employers
and . .. employers; or (3) between . . . employees ... and
...
employees;..."11
"A person or association shall be held to be a person participating . . . in a labor dispute if relief is sought against him or
it, and if he or it is engaged in the same.., occupation in which
such dispute occurs, or has a direct or indirect interest therein,
or is a member, . . . of any association composed in whole or in
'12
part of employers or employees engaged in such ... occupation.
"The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association
or representation of persons in . . seeking to arrange terms or
conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and
' 13
employee.
In spite of this broad and apparently unambiguous language the
lower federal courts have shown considerable confusion as to just what
controversies come within the terms of the act. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, in which the instant case arose, 14 is noted for its
restrictive construction of the applicability of the statute. In United
Electric Coal Cos. v. Rice,15 where one union picketed the plaintiffs'
mines in an effort to coerce them into breaking a contract with another
union, this court held the Norris Act to be inapplicable on the grounds
that the term "labor dispute" implies the existence of an employeremployee relationship. This holding was confirmed in Newton v.
Laclede Steel Co.,"6 where an injunction was issued against picketing
for unionization. The following year the court enjoined a union from
picketing, in order to prevent a general drop in union wages, a "pricecutter," none of whose employees were union men.17 A number of
STAr. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §113(a) (Supp. 1937).
'Id. §113(c).
"tThe decision of the circuit court, holding that no labor dispute was involved
and affirming the injunction issued by the district court, was based on §102, which
declares regarding the employee, "though he should be free to decline to associate
with his fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of association, selforganization, and designation of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate
the terms and conditions of his employment, and that he shall be free from the
247
21

Id.§113(b).

interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor. . .

."

Lauf v. E. G.

Shinner & Co., 82 F. (2d) 68 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), discussed in Legis. (1937) 50
HARV. L. Rav. 1295, (1937) 31 ILL. L. REv. 688.
280 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935), (1936) 36 CoL. L. Rv. 157, (1936) 45
YALE L. J. 1320, (1937) 35 MicH. L. Rav. 1320, cert. denied, 297 U. S. 714 (1936).
" 80 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935). The court in this case states that it is
following the decision in the United Electric Companies case; but here some of the
employees were involved in the picketing union's activities, so the case may have
actually turned on other grounds.

a Scavenger Service Corp. v. Courtney, 85 F. (2d) 825 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
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district courts have likewise applied the "employer-employee" test in
determining the presence or absence of a "labor dispute."18
Most of the lower federal courts, however, have shown little inclination to follow the reversion of the seventh circuit to the reasoning
that was prevalent under the Clayton Act. In Cinderella Theater Co.,
Inc. v. Sign Writers' Local Union"9 the District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan held that union picketing of an employer in an
attempt to force it to replace its single employee with a union man constituted a labor dispute and therefore refused to enjoin such activity.
Subsequent decisions have followed this holding in cases in which the
fact situations were almost identical to that in the principal case.2 0 Labor
disputes have been found to exist in cases of agitation against employers
in order to secure unionization elsewhere, 21 as in Levering & Garrigues
v. Morrn,22 where a union, in an effort to secure a closed shop in the

field of steel construction, threatened architects, owners, and builders
with strikes if all subcontracts for the erection of steel did not provide
for a closed shop. The act has also been held applicable to controversies
between rival unions.23
The principal case serves to set a definite standard for the complete
rejection of the "employer-employee" yardstick in determining what con' Hedges-Walsh-Weidner Co. v. Duffy, C. C. H. Labor Serv. 16,066 (1935)
(D. Tenn. 1934) (picketing for a closed shop held to violate public policy declared in §102) ; Colonial Baking Co. v. Hatenbach, C. C. H. Labor Serv. . 16,051
(1935) (D. Tenn. 1934) (picketing for closed shop) ; In re Cleveland & Sandusky

Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198 (N. D. Ohio 1935), (1935) 49 HARv. L. REv. 341,
(1935) 35 CoL-L.REv.1140, (1935) 45 YALu L. J.. 372, (1935) 21 CORN. L. Q.
137 (dispute between two unions); Donnelly Garment Co. v.International Ladies

Garment Workers' Union, C. C.H. Labor Serv.

18,071 (1937) (W. D. Mo.

1937) (picketing to unionize employees) ; State Brewers Institute v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, C. C, H. Labor Serv. 18,030 (1937) (W. D. Wash.
1937)1 (refusal of teamsters to handle beer transported by non-union truckmen in
effort to secure closed-shop contracts with brewers) ; New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 92 F. (2d) 510 (App. D. C. 1937) (picketing by negro association to secure employment of negro labor).
"6 F. Supp.164 (E.D. Mich. 1934).
" Dean v.Mayo,8 F.Supp.73 (W. D. La.1934), aff'd, 82 F.(2d) 554 (C.C.A.
5th, 1935) ; Miller Parlor Furniture Co. v.Furniture Workers' Industrial Union,
8 F. Supp. 209 (D.N. J. 1934), (1934) 3 Gmo. WAsH. L.REv. 126; Coryell & Son
v. Petroleum Workers Uhion, C. C. H. Labor Serv. 16,318 (1936) (D. Minn.
1936); S. S. Kresge Co. v.Amsler, C. C. H. Labor Serv. 18,004 (1937) (E.D.
Mo. 1937).

'Lake

Charles Stevedores v.Mayo, C. C. H. Labor Serv.

16,177 (1935)

(W. D. La. 1935) (strike to secure unionization at other ports).
"71 F. (2d) 284 (C.C.A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S.595 (1934).
'United States v.Weirton Steel Co., 7 F.Supp. 255 (D.Del. 1934) ; Virginian
Ry. v.System Fed. No.40, Ry. Employees of A. F.of L., 84 F. (2d) 641 (C.C.
A. 4th, 1936). In both of these cases, however, one of the unions was a company
union, and hence the situation might be said to be practically the same as where
the dispute is between an employer and a union. See (1937) 50 HARy. L. REv.
1295, 1299. The act has been held to apply to employee plaintiffs as well as em1933)
ployer plaintiffs. Stanley v. Peabody Coal Co., 5 F. Supp. 612 (S.D. Ill.
(union seeking to enjoin employer from violating N.I.R.A.); Cole v. Atlanta
Terminal Co., 15 F. Supp. 131 (N. D. Ga. 1936) (one group of employees seeking
to enjoin another).
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stitutes a labor dispute under the anti-injunction statutes. 24 Clearly the
decision is in line with both the wording of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
and the intent of Congress in enacting it.25 The results, however, are
questionable. It is conceded that the arguments in favor of such a
statute and an unrestricted construction of it are powerful. The individual employee has little bargaining power in our modem civilization
and, in order to bargain effectively, labor must organize. The complexity of the economic society of today and the integration of industrial
units make organization of entire industries necessary in order to be
effective.26 Labor must, to bring about that organization, have freedom to agitate for unionization, to strike and picket for the absorption
of the weaker unions by the stronger, and to coerce the individual employee into giving up his "freedom of contract." While such freedom
may work hardship on a few employees and employers, the ultimate
object of unionization and the consequent equalization of the respective
might possibly render the means
bargaining powers of capital and labor
27
worthwhile in the light of the end.
The fact remains, however, that the decision in the principal case
leaves the door open for great injustice in individual cases. It gives the
unions power to monopolize labor and deprive the individual employee
of the privilege of contracting for himself. 28 An employer may be
forced to stand by and watch his business ruined by a quarrel between
two unions in which he takes no part. 29 The scales of bargaining power
are so far tilted that the small employer may have all means of livelihood taken from him simply because he is unable to comply with unreasonable union demands.3 0 Satisfied employees may be compelled to join
I Thirteen states have enacted statutes similar in terms to the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Michie, 1935) c. 97, §78; Idaho Sess. Laws 1933, c. 215;
IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns, 1933) §40-501 et seq.; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, Supp.
(1936) §4379.5 et seq.; MD. CODE ANN. (Bagby, Supp. 1935) c. 574, §67; Mass.
Acts 1935, c. 407; MINN. STAT. (Mason, Supp. 1936) §4260-1 et seq.; N. Y. CrIVL
PRACTIcE (Cahill, Supp. 1936) §876a; N. D. Laws 1935, c. 247; ORE. CODE ANN.
(Supp. 1935) §49-1901 et seq.; UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) §49-2-1 et seq.;
WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) §7612; Wis. STAT. (1935) §103.51
et seq. Twelve other states have some form of anti-injunction legislation. A iz.
REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer, 1928) §4286 et teq.; CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering,
1931) act 1605; ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. (Cahill, 1933) c. 22, §58; KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. (Corrick, 1935) c. 60, §1104 et seq.; Maine Laws 1933, c. 261; MONT.. REv.
CODE ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §9242; N. H. Pub. Laws 1926, c. 380,
§27, as amended by N. H. Pub. Laws 1935, c. 46; N. J. REv. STAT. (1937) §2:2977; OKLA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) §10878; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) §43-203; R. I.
Acts and Resolves 1936, c. 2359; Wyo. Sess. Laws 1937, c. 15, §1.
75 CONG. REc. 4916, 5483, 5489 (1932).
= Note (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 896.FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, op. cit. supra note 4, 24-46; Sayre, Inducing
Breach of Contract (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 695: Note (1936) 21 CORN.
L. Q. 640; (1936) 35 MicH. L. REv. 340; (1933) 10 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 404.
-(1936) 11 W!,SH. L. REV. 53.
(1937) 6 FORDHAm L. REV. 140.
oSee Senn v. Tile Layers Protection Union, 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81
L. ed. 1229 (1937), (1937) 16 N. C. L. REv. 38.
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an organization in which they are uninterested and to contribute to a
cause which they have no desire to further. And, finally, labor disputes
may be utilized for objectives other than the furtherance of unionization
and collective bargaining.31
JAmEs D. CARR.
Mortgages-Absolute Deeds Construed As.

The plaintiffs, needing funds to redeem a mortgage, applied to the
defendant, who refused to make the loan on the security of the mortgaged property, but offered to buy it for the amount of the proposed
loan ($7,000) and to give the plaintiffs an option to repurchase within
one year. Thereupon the plaintiffs conveyed the property to defendant
by an absolute deed; and contemporaneously the defendant executed a
contract to reconvey upon the payment of the $7,000 with interest, the
contract to be null and void if not fully complied with. One of the plaintiffs remained in possession, but under the contract they were obligated
to pay in addition to interest $100.00 per month rent for twelve months,
and also any sums advanced for insurance, taxes, and repairs. Plaintiffs seek to have the deed and contract declared a mortgage, alleging
that they and the defendant both intended the transaction to constitute
a loan of money secured by the deed with separate contract to reconvey.
Denying that there was any loan or that the purpose and intention of
the parties was to create the relationship of creditor and debtor or mortgagor and mortgagee, the defendant claims that since plaintiffs failed to
exercise their option, the contract is now null and void. Plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied; and at the trial it was
shown, among other things, that the property was worth between $17,000
and $25,000. On the only issue submitted to the jury, whether the two
instruments were intended as a security for the loan of money, the judge
charged that the evidence must be clear, strong, and convincing to sustain a verdict for plaintiffs. Held, (1) the agreement to reconvey being
a mere option and plaintiffs, grantors, not being absolutely bound to pay
the amount stipulated, there was no relation of creditor and debtor on
the face of the written document; hence, they were not entitled to judgment on the pleadings; (2) since it was not an action for reformation
but only to show that the two instruments were intended as security, a
mere preponderance of evidence was sufficient to support the issue;
hence, there was error in the judge's charge.'
That an absolute deed given as security will be construed as a mortgage in equity is well settled, although the grounds upon which this
relief will be granted vary.2 Since North Carolina has no public policy
-(1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 248.
1O'Briant v. Lee, 212 N. C. 793, 195 S. E. 15 (1938).
'Sprague v. Bond, 115 N. C. 530, 531, 20 S. E. 709 (1894).
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favoring the protection of the grantor in an absolute deed intended as
security, in an action to convert such a deed into a mortgage two principles are controlling: "1. It must be alleged and proven that the
clause of redemption was omitted by reason of ignorance, mistake,
fraud, or undue advantage; 2. the intention (to create a security) must
be established, not merely by proof of declarations, but by proof of
facts and circumstances, dehors the deed, inconsistent with the idea of
an absolute purchase."
Where there is an absolute deed with an oral defeasance agreement,
4
the two principles are treated as concurrent prerequisites to relief.
Furthermore, in applying these principles the court has laid down the
rule that fraud, etc., must be established by clear, strong, cogent, and
convincing evidence. 5 However, evidence as to this intention is not admissible until the allegation of fraud, etc., has been sustained.8 There
is one discordant case among those supporting the above propositions,
namely, Fuller v. Jenkins,7 where the court held that if the instrument
was intended as security it would be held.a mortgage, even though it
was not shown that the clause of redemptiori was omitted by reason of
fraud, etc. However, in the subsequent case of Williamson v. Rabon,8
Hoke, J., in reaffirming the prior holdings of the court, expressly
overruled this decision and classified it as an inadvertence, stating: "The
principle appearing in Fuller v. Jenkins is in direct antagonism to the
law of the State, as established by a current of decisions, well nigh from
the beginning of the court, certainly as far back as Streator v.Jones."9
'McLaurin v. Wright, 37 N. C. 94 (1841); Allen v. McRae, 39 N. C. 325
(1846); Kelly v. Bryan, 41 N. C. 283 (1849); Sellers v. Stalcup, 42 N. C. 13
(1850); Sowell v. Barrett, 45 N. C. 50 (1852) ; Brown v. Carson, 45 N. C. 272
(1853); Cook v. Gudger, 55 N. C. 172 (1855); Brothers v. Harrill, 55 N. C. 209
(1855); Glisson v. Hill, 55 N. C. 256 (1855); Steel v. Black, 56 N. C. 427 (1857) ;
Sprague v. Bond, 115 N. C. 530, 20 S. E. 709 (1894); Frazier v. Frazier, 129
N. C. 30, 39 S. E. 634 (1901) ; Newton v. Clark, 174 N. C. 393, 93 S. E. 951
(1917); Williamson v. Rabon, 177 N. C. 302, 98 S.E. 830 (1919); Newbern v.
Newbern, 178 N. C. 3, 100 S. E. 77 (1919). It is interesting to note that many
of the cases cite Streator v. Jones, 10 N, C. 423 (1824), as being the origin of
the two principles. It was, but they were originated by Taylor, C. J., in the dissenting opinion.
'See note 3, supra; Streator v. Jones, 5 N. C. 449 (1810); McDonald v.
McLeod, 36 N. C. 221 (1840) ; Briant v. Corpening, 62 N. C. 325 (1868) ; Egerton
v. Jones, 102 N. C. 278, 9 S.E. 2 (1889) ; Norris v. McLam, 104 N. C. 159, 10
S. E. 140 (1889) ; Green v. Sherrod, 105 N. C. 197, 10 S.E. 986 (1890) ; Egerton
v. Jones, 107 N. C. 284, 12 S.E. 434 (1890) ; Chilton v. Smith, 180 N. C. 472, 105
S. E. 1 (1920) ; Waddell v. Aycock, 195 N. C. 268, 142 S.E. 10 (1928).
'Lewis v. Owen, 36 N. C. 290 (1840); Franklin v. Roberts, "37 N. C. 560
(1843) ; Blaclowell v. Overby, 41 N. C. 38 (1849) ; Elliot v. Maxwell, 42 N. C.
246 (1851) ; Moore v. Ivey, 43 N. C. 192 (1851) ; Culbreth v. Hall, 159 N. C. 588,
75 S.E. 1096 (1912) ; Ray v. Patterson, 170 N. C. 226, 87 S.E. 212 (1915).
'Streator v. Jones, 5 N. C. 449 (1810) ; Kimborough v. Smith, 17 N. C. 558
(1834) ; McLaurir%v. Wright, 37 N. C. 94 (1841) ; Chilton v. Smith, 180 N. C.
472, 105 S.E. 1 (1920).
1130 N. C.554, 41 S.E. 706 (1902).
'177 N. C. 302, 98 S.E. 830 (1919).
9Id. at 306, 98 S.E. at 831.
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Where, however, there is an absolute deed accompanied by a written
contract or bond to reconvey, or option to repurchase, in contrast to the
above situation the question as to the omission of the clause of redemption is not involved. The court in these cases has either passed
over the first principle without even noting it,10 or when mentioning it
has stated that it is not applicable. 1 Thus, it is sufficient merely to
show that the instruments were intended as security, 12 this constituting
the only point in issue, but the evidence must be clear, strong, cogent,
and convincing,13 a mere preponderance not being sufficient.
Regardless of which category a particular case may fall into, the
question of how to determine the intent of the parties to create a security is always present. Mere proof of declarations is not sufficient.
Factors which the court has considered very persuasive are: the distresses of the maker of the deed,' 4 the prior negotiation of the parties, 15
the continued existence of the debt,' 6 possession by the grantor without
the payment of rent,17 the payment of interest,18 the fact that the amount
advanced was the exact amount that the grantor needed to pay an existing indebtedness,' 9 and the gross inadequacy of the price.20 While none
of these alone is conclusive of the issue, nevertheless, a combination of
several will go a long way in showing that the deed was in fact intended
as a mortgage, and the relative weight to be given each may vary with
the case depending on the attendant circumstances. In this connection
" Wilcox's Heirs v. Morris, 5 N. C. 116 (1806) ; Gillis v. Martin, 17 N. C. 470
(1833); Mason v. Hearne, 45 N. C. 88 (1852); Robinson v. Willoughby, 65 N. C.

5202 (1871).
'Hall v. Lewis, 118 N. C. 509, 24 S. E. 209 (1896); Watkins v. Williams, 123
N. C. 170, 31 S. E. 388 (1898) ; Porter v. White, 128 N. C. 42, 38 S. E. 24 (1901);
Perry v. Southern Surety Co., 190 N. C. 284, 129 S. E. 721 (1925).
See notes 10 and 11, supra.
"' Waters v. Crabtree, 105.N. C. 394, 11 S. E. 240 (1890) ; Porter v. White, 128
N. C. 42, 38 S. E. 24 (1901). Accord: Ray v. Patterson, 170 N. C. 226, 87 S. E.
212 (1915).
" Blackwell v. O~verby, 41 N. C. 38 (1849).

1Kimborough v. Smith, 17 N. C. 558 (1834); Blackwell v. Overby, 41 N. C.

38 (1849).
' Robinson v. Willoughby, 65 N. C. 520 (1871) ; see Sprague v. Bond, 115
N. C. 530, 533, 20 S. E. 709, 710 (1894).
'Blackwell v. Overby, 41 N. C. 38 (1849); Sellers v. Stalcup, 42 N. C. 13
(1850) ; Kemp v. Earp, 42 N. C. 167 (1850) ; Steel v. Black, 56 N. C. 428 (1857);
Culbreth v. Hall, 159 N. C. 588, 75 S. E. 1096 (1912).
"See Lewis v. Owen,
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N. C. 290, 297 (1840).

"Kimborough v. Smith, 17 N. C. 558 (1834); Kemp v. Earp, 42 N. C. 167
(1850).
2 Wilcox's Heirs v. Morris, 5 N. C. 116 (1806); Streator v. Jones, 10 N. C.
423 (1824); Kimborough v. Smith, 17 N. C. 558 (1834); McDonald v. McLeod,

36 N. C. 221 (1840); McLaurin v. Wright, 37 N. C. 94 (1841); Blackwell v.
Overby, 41 N. C. 38 (1849); Sellers v. Stalcup, 42 N. C. 13 (1850); Kemp v.
Earp, 42 N. C. 167 (1850); Elliot v. Maxwell, 42 N. C. 246 (1851); Moore v.
Ivey, 43 N. C. 192 (1851) ; Steel v. Black, 56 N. C. 428 (1857) ; Sprague v. Bond,
115 N. C. 530, 20 S. E. 70R (1894); Note (1934) 90 A. L. R. 953 (value of
property as factor in determining whether deed intended as mortgage).
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it is worth while to note that in doubtful cases the court likely will lean
toward the conclusion that a security was meant rather than a sale, because this subserves the ends of abstract justice and averts injurious
21
consequences.
The principal case clearly falls into the second category above. Thus,
the holding of the court that a mere preponderance of evidence is sufficient to establish the intention of the parties is clearly contrary to the
established rule. Even under the true rule as to the quantum of proof,
the prior negotiations of the parties, the fact that the sum advanced
was the approximate sum that the plaintiffs needed to prevent the consummation of the foreclosure, the necessitous circumstances of the plaintiffs, their unwillingness to allow the then pending foreclosure sale to
become complete, and the gross inadequacy of the price, together with
the fact that one of the plaintiffs remained in possession, even though
under the option to repurchase, are sufficient to justify a finding that
the transaction was intended as security.
Conceding that an absolute deed with a separate option to repurchase 22 should not as a matter of law or equity be construed as a mortgage, still such transactions should be closely scrutinized in order to
avoid the obvious danger of imposition on a distressed boriower. If
the debtors in the instant case pay, the creditor not only gets the principal but also usury in the guise of rent. Whereas, if the debtors do
not redeem, the creditor gets property the value of which is greatly in
excess of the amount of the loan. In all cases where the transaction
is determined to be a mortgage, the rent payments should be allowed in
reduction of the principal, otherwise the usury statute is evaded.

Wm. R. DAWES.
Workmen's Compensation-The Status of the Deputy
Sheriff in North Carolina.
In speaking of the deputy sheriff the North Carolina court has said,
"the deputy is an officer coeval in point of antiquity with the sheriff."'
However, despite the antiquity of his office, two recent cases illustrate
the uncertainty still existent as to his exact legal status.2 Both cases
grew out of proceedings to determine whether or not a fee deputy comes
IWatkins v. Williams, 123 N. C. 170, 175, 31 S. E. 388, 390 (1898) ; Perry v.
Southern Surety Co., 190 N. C. 284, 291, 129 S. E. 721, 724 (1925).
0 Note (1932) 79 A. L. R. 937 (deed absolute on its face, with contemporaneous
agreement of option for repurchase by grantor, as a mortgage vel non).
'Lanier v. Greenville, 174 N. C. 311, 316, 93 S.E. 850, 853 (i917).
'Borders v. Cline, 212 N. C. 472, 193 S. E. 826 (1937); Styers v. Forsyth
County, 212 N. C. 558, 194 S.E. 305 (1937).
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within the purview of the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation
Act.3 Both decisions were reached by a four to three majority. 4
While -the two cases were decided at the same term and reach the
same result, they proceed upon somewhat different theories.
Justice Winborne, writing, the opinion in Borders v. Cline,5 first discusses whether or not a deputy comes within the meaning of the term
"employment" as defined in the Workmen's Compensation Act. He condudes that a deputy is not so included because his employment does not
fall into one of the enumerated categories of the act, i.e., "employment
by the State, and all its political subdivisions thereof and all public and
quasi-public corporations therein and all private employments." Reaching such a conclusion would seem to obviate the determination of any
further questions; however, the opinion continues with a discussion of
the historic status of a fee deputy reaching the result that he is not an
employee of the sheriff. While no definite stand is taken on the specific
'For an excellent discussion of the sheriff and deputy in North Carolina see
Gardner, TJhe Structure and Organization of the Sheriff's Office in North Car-

olina (1936) Pop'. Gov'T, Guidebook Series no. 8.

While cases involving the question as to whether a deputy sheriff is entitled
to 'workmen's compensation are rare the following show a diversity of authority:
Monterey County v. Rader, 199 Cal. 221, 248 Pac. 912 (1926) (A deputy sheriff,
who is not appointed for his own convenience [i.e., to serve a personal interest]
is entitled to the benefits of the compensatory provisions of the act.) ; Bowden v.
Cumberland County, 123 Me. 359, 123 Atl. 166 (1924) (A deputy sheriff acting
as a court officer does not exercise an executive function under the executive
department of the state, nor is he an "employee" of any department relative to
workmen's compensation.); Curran v. Delta County, 230 Mich. 646, 203 N. W.
470 (1925) (Special deputy was awarded compensation against the county when
killed while attempting to capture an escaped convict.); Milliard County v. Industrial Commission, 62 Utah 46, 217 Pac. 974 (1923) (Sheriff's assistant employed to capture escaped prisoner held art employee of the county within workmen's compensation provisions.) ; Board of Sup'rs v. Lucas, 142 Va. 84, 128 S. E.
574 (1925) (A deputy sheriff, enforcing prohibition act for fees connected therewith held not an employee of the county within the meaning of the workmen's
compensation act.) ; Nix v. Dep't of Labor and Industries, 186 Wash. 651, 59 P.
(2d) 740 (1936) (Discharged deputy who retained commission and acted as special deputy on special assignments and who was paid by parties requesting services, held not "salaried" peace officer of county and not entitled to workmen's
compensation.),
"Justice Devin, writing the dissenting opinion in the Cline case, uses the following arguments: (1) That the comprehensive language of the workmen's compensation act and the statutory definitions of the terms "employment," "employer"
and "employee" are sufficiently broad to embrace the service or emplovment of the
sheriff's deputies. (2) The amendment to the act allowing sheriffs to exempt
themselves from its terms shows the legislative intent that deputies be included.
(3) The Industrial Commission has always ruled that the sheriff's deputies are
within the act and the sheriff in this case had taken out insurance under the act
on the assumption that the deputy was an employee. (4) The fact that the fees
received by the deputy are not usually paid to him by the sheriff should not be
held controlling, for the reason that compensation for his service is received by
him by virtue of his appointment and employment by the sheriff in whose name
alone he is empowered to act. (5) The deputy renders valuable service to the
public and his services involve great danger to himself.
r212 N. C. 472, 193 S. E. 826 (1937).
6 N. C. CoE AiN. (Michie, 1935) §8081 (i).
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point, the court quotes with approval an authority to the effect that a
7
deputy is a public officer.
The court in Styers v. Forsyth County, speaking through Chief Justice Stacy, decides that a fee deputy is not an employee of the county because, "The commissioners exercise no control or supervision over fee
deputies." s The holding of the Cline case is affirmed to the effect that
the deputy is not an employee of the sheriff, and it is added that he
"acts as vice principal or alter ego of the sheriff." 9 Past decisions in
which the North Carolina court has given to the deputy such appellations as "employee," 10 "agent," 11 and "servant"' 12 are distinguished on
the ground that those cases involved merely the liability of the sheriff
to third parties for tortious acts of the deputy and not the relationship
of the deputy to the sheriff. The court leaves open the question whether
a salaried deputy, under the control and supervision of the county, would
be considered one of its employees for purposes of workmen's compensation.
From the two instant cases it is apparent that the status of a fee
deputy is a peculiar, if not unfortunate one. Although appointed by.the
sheriff, drawing his authority from him, and acting under his orders,
he is neither employee nor agent of the sheriff. While on the other
hand, although he acts with county wide authority and is often paid by
fees from the county treasury, he is not, for purposes of workmen's
compensation, an employee or agent of the county. His sorrowful plight
is aptly characterized by Justice Devin in his dissent in the Slyers case,
"The holding of this court that the deputy sheriff is an employee neither
of the county nor the sheriff leaves his employment status as a species
13
of nultius filus-he is employed by nobody-yet he serves."'
For over a hundred years the North Carolina court has had occasion to examine and determine the status of the deputy sheriff. And
in cases involving the liability of the sheriff for wrongful acts of
the deputy the court has consistently referred to their relationship as
one of principal and agent. Accordingly it has been held that an action
for false imprisonment will lie against the sheriff for an illegal arrest
by hig deputy,' 4 the sheriff is liable for the failure of his deputy to col1212 N. C. 472, 476, 193 S. E. 826, 829, "It is said in 57 C. J., 731, sec 4, 'A

deputy is the deputy of the sheriff, one appointed to act ordinarily for the sheriff
and not in his own name, person or right, and although ordinarily appointed by
the sheriff, is considered a public officer'."
8212 N. C. 558, 561, 194 S. E. 305, 306 (1937).
Old. at 564, 194 S. E. at 308.
" Cansler v. Penland, 125 N. C. 578, 34 S. E. 683 (1899).
" Horne v. Allen, 27 N. C. 36 (1844).
'Hampton v. Brown, 35 N. C. 18 (1851).
Styers v. Forsyth County, 212 N. C. 558, 565, 194 S. E. 305, 309 (1937).
"Spencer v. Moore, 19 N. C. 264 (1837).
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lect a debt, 15 trespass by the deputy gives rise to an action against the
sheriff,16 where money has been collected by the deputy a demand upon
him is equivalent to a demand upon the sheriff,17 admissions or declarations of the deputy may be used in evidence against the sheriff,13 and
the sheriff is held liable for a false return by his deputy.10
Cases not involving the tortious acts of the deputy also proceed upon
the agency doctrine. For example it was held that a deputy could not
maintain trover or trespass for goods seized on execution and taken
from him by another, because, said the court, "he is merely the servant
of his superior and holds for him."' 20 And where the sheriff was removed from office upon official ascertainment of his insanity the agency
21
of his deputies was held to be terminated.
In Jamesville and Wash. R. R. v. Fisher,22 the court in holding that
a sheriff could appoint a minor as his deputy, used language which seems
strongly to indicate that the law of agency should apply to all sheriffdeputy relations. The court stated, "Thus in every way, the courts of
this country have, in the absence of specific statutory provisions, adjusted the powers of sheriffs and their deputies, and their liability to the
public and to each other according to the rules which determine the
duties and responsibility of principal and agent. ''23 Further. language in
the case indicates the feeling of the court that the employment of the
deputy is of a private status. The court added, "the courts ...have
recognized the right of the sheriff to select such agents for the discharge
of mere ministerial duties as an individual could appoint and constitute
24
for the transaction of private business."
From a review of the above cases it can be readily seen that the court
in the Borders and Styers cases would have had little trouble in holding
the deputy to be an employee of the sheriff. However, such a decision
would have done nothing toward allowing him compensation in view of
the court's finding that his employment was not within the purview of
the act. This decision would also seem to exclude clerical assistants
of the sheriff from enjoying the benefits of compensation.
The inclusion of the fee deputy within the scope of workmen's compensation would accomplish a socially desirable result. The legislature
should enact an amendment including all deputies and clerical assistants
HARRY LEE RIDDLE, JR.
of the sheriff.
" State v. Roane, 24 N. C. 144 (1841); McClean v. Buchanan, 53 N. C. 444
(1862).

"0 Satterwhite v. Carson, 25 N. C. 549 (1843).
'Lyle v. Wilson, 26 N. C. 227 (1844).
Horne v. Allen, 27 N. C. 36 (1844).
'Martin
v. Martin, 47 N. C. 285 (1855).
t
Hampton v. Brown, 35 N. C. 18, 20 (1851).
21Somers v. Comm'rs, 123 N. C. 582, 31 S. E. 873 (1898).
109 N. C. 1, 13 S.E. 698 (1891).
21Id. at 6,13 S.E.at 700.
1Id. at 5, 13 S. E. at 700.

